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ABSTRACT
The Federal and California False Claims Acts (FCA)
are "whistle blower" legislation which encourage anyone 
who is aware of a false claim, to come forward and win a 
percentage of the money collected in successful
litigation. These laws are based on European laws and were 
first instituted in the United States by President Lincoln 
during the Civil War. Revised versions of these laws made 
them more useful and much FCA litigation has brought in 
considerable dollars across the United States. This paper 
explores the implications of these laws in particular for 
the California Department of Transportation.
The construction of state highway projects is bid out 
each year at approximately three billion dollars. Claims 
from contractors for additional compensation are common. 
This paper investigates the policies and procedures for 
handling claims and explores the FCA case law and its' 
implications for the Department of Transportation's
contract administration.
The FCA case law establishes the constitutionally of 
the act, defines the public disclosure bar and original 
source provisions of the law and provides guidance with 
respect to the government intervention provisions of the 
law. In addition the case law gives good examples relevant
iii
to the construction industry. The act has proven itself 
constitutionally sound. Supreme Court rulings have 
addressed concerns with violation of the separation of 
powers requirements of the constitution, whether a qui tam 
(plaintiff) has standing and the possible violation of the 
due process requirements of the constitution.
Caltrans has well-established methods for handling 
construction claims for additional compensation, including 
Dispute Review Boards, Board of Reviews and a legal 
department to handle settlements and arbitration. Many 
changes occur during the administration of a construction 
project. These changes are handled through contract change 
orders. Many times however, disputes between the state and
the contractors over the merit and cost lead to unsettled
claims for additional compensation. Most times the claims 
are honest contract disputes, however sometimes these 
claims are fraudulent and costs are exaggerated. This 
paper addresses the implications of FCA actions by the 
government and/or private qui tam litigation against
contractors and the claims submitted to the state on
Caltrans' construction projects.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I WISH TO THANK DR. DAVID
BELLIS AND DR. CHARLES
CHRISTIE FOR THEIR GUIDANCE IN
WRITING THIS PAPER.
v
DEDICATION
THIS PAPER IS DEDICATED TO MY FAMILY, MY WIFE JANE AND MY
CHILDREN HENRY, RENEE AND JANELLE.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT...................................................  iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS............................................ . V
LIST OF TABLES..............................................viii
LIST OF FIGURES............................................ ix
CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND
Introduction to the Study ..................... 1
The Caltrans Organization Chart .................. 3
Statement of the Problem.......................... 4
Purpose of the Study............................... 5
Theoretical Basis and Organization ............... 7
Limitations of the Study .....................  10
Nomenclature .......................................  11
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction .......................................  16
History of the False Claims Act................... 16
The False Claims Act Law..........................  22
Rules and Procedures............................... 27
Civil Investigative Demands....................... 28
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
Design of the Investigation....................... 2 9
Population.......................................... 30
Treatment........................................... 30
Data Analysis Procedures ..........................  31
vi
CHAPTER FOUR: CASE LAW
Constitutionality Case Law........................ 33
Public Disclosure Bare and Original Source
Case Law............................................ 48
Government Intervention Case Law.................  51
California's False Claims Act ..................... 54
Construction Contracts, Relevant Case Law ........ 62
CHAPTER FIVE: CALTRANS PREEXISTING MECHANISMS
Engineers and Contractors Debate over
Contract Change Orders ............................  69
Dispute Review Boards .............................. 72
Board of Review..................................... 8 0
Arbitration........................................  81
CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary............................................. 92
Conclusion...........................................106
Recommendations..................................... 114
APPENDIX A: CALTRANS ORGANIZATION CHART.....................116
APPENDIX B: FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT....................... 118
APPENDIX C: CALIFORNIA FALSE CLAIMS ACT.....................123
REFERENCES................................................... 134
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Disbute Review Board Recommendation
Acceptance Rates by Party ........................  77
Table 2. Frequency of Dispute Review Board
Issues .............................................78
Table 3. Board of Review Awards ............................81
Table 4. Caltrans Construction Arbitration Filing
History Through December .........................  82
Table 5. Arbitration Results 1996-2002....................  83
Table 6. Arbitration Results 1996-2002....................  84
Table 7. Arbitration Results 1996-2002................. . 85
Table 8. Current Arbitration Status by District
Number of Compliants Filed in 2002 ..............  8 6
Table 9. Dollars Claimed by District for 2001.............  87
Table 10. Current Unresolved Cases ........................  89
Table 11. Cumulative Active Arbitration Cases ............  89
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Dispute Review Board Recommendations............ 75
Figure 2. Claims Resolution Timeline Day 1 Through
Day 240 ........................................... 7 6
Figure 3. Dispute Review Board Recommendations on
Structure Cases .................................  79
ix
CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND
Introduction to the Study
As the author of this paper I currently work for the 
California Department of Transportation. I am a Senior 
Bridge Engineer working in construction. It is the Senior 
Bridge Engineer's responsibility to supervise Resident 
Engineers, Structure Representatives, and Assistant 
Structure Representatives. The primary function of these 
staff is to administer the department's construction 
contracts. Often questions are asked regarding the False
Claims Acts and the implications for the California 
Department of Transportation highway construction
programs.
The California Department of Transportation is 
responsible for the planning, design, construction, 
improvement, operation, maintenance, rehabilitation and 
seismic retrofit of the state highway system (20:49). 
California's state highways support the vast majority of 
all travel in the state, including both personal and 
commercial transportation. "The state highway system, 
which comprises less than nine percent of the total 
roadway mileage in California, handles fifty-three percent
of the miles traveled (10:82)".
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The department's highest priorities are maintaining 
and rehabilitating roads and highways while building new 
projects. The Capital Outlays Projects program funds the
contracts for this work (14:3). These contracts are
typically awarded to the lowest bidder.
Private construction contractors are responsible for
the fulfillment of these contracts. The Department of 
Transportation's engineers are given the responsibility of 
administrating these contracts. The State Transportation 
Improvement Program (STIP) makes up the majority of these
construction contracts and has an annual budget of
approximately three billion dollars (7:6). The STIP 
determines which contracts will be funded chronologically
for the state of California on a seven-year time frame.
The construction companies awarded the construction 
contracts are required by each project contract to adhere 
to the plans, specifications and special provisions of the
state. Administration of these contracts requires
inspection to guarantee that the contract requirements are 
meet. The state's engineers are responsible for 
construction inspection. Additionally, the engineer must 
process payments based upon job completion levels 
throughout the course of the project.
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The Caltrans Organization Chart
Like many other bureaucracies the Caltrans'
organizational chart can be characterized as a rational, 
conscious and institutionalized arrangement of the 
division of labor (27:4). Similar to the Weberian concept 
of bureaucratic organizations where the division of labor 
must be carried out through non overlapping functional 
divisions, with a hierarchy of coordination and control 
with procedures and rules of action (28:4). The Caltrans' 
organizational chart is arranged in two fashions both 
horizontally and vertically (See Appendix A). The 
horizontal one is a hierarchical ordering from the 
organizations' director enumerating down to each deputy 
director as the department heads are called. The 
organization chart functions as an image map that link 
organization chart "boxes" to the respective function 
statements for each division. For example, the Accounting 
and Budget departments are below the Finance Deputy
Director, as the Network Operations Department is under
Information Technology Deputy and the Construction and 
Design departments are under Project Delivery Deputy.
These charts graphically illustrate the administrative
structure of the different functional units within the
organization.
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Additionally on the far right of the chart it is 
organized vertically. Each vertical box represents a 
region with the state of California. The regions are 
divided geographic regions. These regions are called 
districts and numbered 1 through 12 statewide (See 
Appendix A). Traditionally these regions try to follow 
already dictated boundaries like the county line. For 
example, Region 8 contains the geographical areas of
Riverside and San Bernardino counties.
Statement of the Problem
On state construction projects often the construction 
contractor will file a "notice of potential claims" for
additional compensation. These claims may be based upon 
alterations of the original contract or unforeseen work or 
ambiguities in the contract. When merit is found in the 
contractor's claim, changes are handled with contract 
change orders (CCOs). The CCOs are laid out on a
standardized form and are most times negotiated by the 
state engineers on the project and the contractor's 
superintendent at the job site. Statewide, these claims
amount to hundreds of millions of dollars annually. These 
claims are either settled at the project level with CCOs,
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settled after the contract is completed, or settled in
arbitration.
Many of the claims submitted are considered to be
without merit by the state at the project level. However,
these claims are often settled as a "business decision"
after the project completion. Typically, this is a more
cost-effective solution rather than the cost of litigation
in arbitration.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to analyze the Federal
and State of California's False Claims Acts and ascertain
the implications for the California Department of
Transportation. The California Department of
Transportation is believed to be experiencing a
significant number of false claims in the Capital Outlays 
(Construction) Projects. The study will utilize 
legislative, managerial and financial analysis techniques 
to examine the impacts of false claims upon the Department
of Transportation Construction Projects.
This study is significant because of the large amount
of money spent on claims considered to be without merit or 
fraudulent statewide. Throughout the construction process, 
it is the engineer's responsibility to protect the state's 
interest and the state's dollars. The investigation will
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expand, upon the legislative analyses and discuss the 
ramifications of the implementation of these laws with 
respect to past and current situations.
This study differs from previous studies on the False 
Claims Act, since it focuses on the implication for the 
California Department of Transportation. Specifically, 
this investigation is limited to the new construction and 
rehabilitation projects, included in the Capital Outlays'
funds. Other reviews and studies of the False Claims Act
will be illustrated in the literature review section. They 
will be used to support the analysis portion of the study 
and to demonstrate the problem through case reviews. This 
investigation extends present knowledge by examining it
under the context of construction issues.
Crucial to the research goals are studying the 
department's organizational structure and the construction 
claims process. This paper will include a detailed look at 
the organizational structure from planning to design 
through construction to maintenance. The construction 
process will be examined focusing on the claims process. 
The objective will be a thorough understanding of the
process. The research will also examine data collected
statewide relative to claims, settlements and
arbitrations.
6
IAn analysis of statewide construction projects will 
be included. Data will be complied for a study of 
construction claims throughout the state. Cost on claims 
will be reviewed on a district by district basis. 
Settlement and arbitration results will be compiled, again
by district; to determine construction claims costs. The 
Capital Outlays Project budget will be studied to better 
understand the impacts of claims on the State
Transportation Improvement Program.
Departmental organization charts will be included and 
shown to illustrate the hierarchy used to make policy 
decisions. Interviews and surveys will be conducted to 
ensure all possible policies are researched and 
investigated. Caltrans' officials will be asked for 
personal accounts of administration where false claims are 
suspected. And all findings, conclusions and
recommendations will then be presented in the work.
Theoretical Basis and Organization
The work is organized based on a categorical system. 
Review of the case law is based upon each unique aspect of 
the legislation. The history of the advent of the
legislation is organized in a chronological fashion dating 
from its inception, through the Lincoln presidency, and to
the current versions of the federal law. The state version
7
of the law for California and other states will be
discussed as it may pertain to case studies.
Lawyers publicize many other False Claim studies, in 
order to keep them abreast of the legislation so that they
may represent clients to the best of their abilities.
Prosecuting or defending parties to False Claims Act suits 
can enhance a lawyer's reputation and are often publicized 
due to the large monetary awards associated with some of
the cases.
Other research on the False Claims Act is performed 
by non-profit organizations such as the Taxpayers Against 
Fraud. This organization hopes to alleviate over spending 
in the public sector so that all Americans benefit by 
paying less tax.
Additionally other non-profit organizations like the 
Government Accountability Project (GAP) act to litigate 
whistleblower cases. Their mission is to protect the 
public interest by promoting government and corporate 
accountability through advancing occupational free speech 
and ethical conduct, defending whistleblowers, and 
empowering citizen activists. Founded in 1977, GAP is a
public interest organization and law firm that receives
funding from foundations, individuals, and legal fees
(15:1) .
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The theoretical basis 'for the study is that the State 
of California through the Caltrans' Capital Outlay's 
budget is paying too many falsely submitted construction 
claims for new highway construction and rehabilitation 
projects. Is this caused by fraud? Does submitting a 
fraudulent notice of potential claim constitute a 
violation of the False Claims Act? Does payment have to be
made in order for a false claim to be a violation of the
False Claims Act? Can the state benefit from the
Department of Transportation's use of the Federal or State 
False Claims Acts? Will this legislation help reduce costs
for the Caltrans' organization? Is there a down side to 
the prosecution of state contractors using the False
Claims Act?
The conceptual framework is that the laws provide a 
financial remedy for abuse. Is the state able to utilize 
these laws for it's financial advantage? Can the state 
recoup any loses they have already incurred on
construction fraud? Will utilizing the legislation 
increase Caltrans' legislative budget? How would the 
implementation of these laws affect the organization? A 
look at the potential impacts on the department will 
include the affects on policy, management and the budget.
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One hypothesis is that the state is paying millions
in construction claims. Are all these claims warranted?
Are they being settled properly to the financial advantage 
or disadvantage of the state? Another hypothesis is that 
by utilizing the Federal or State False Claims Acts the 
state will reduce construction claims and thereby save
money.
Limitations of the Study
One of the primary limitations of the study is that 
we will use historical claims for analysis since we are 
not aware of all current construction claims as they are 
occurring on a daily basis all across the state of 
California and the nation. This presents us with a 
methodological limitation for the study. The research will 
work around this limitation by using this historical 
background as a lessons-learned basis for future claim 
analysis.
Another limitation of the study is that "engineering 
judgement and discretion" are often factored into the 
negotiation of construction claims. This represents a
content limitation for the study. The research will work 
around these limitations by offering different 
interpretation of the engineer's judgement when necessary 
in an attempt to explain the construction difficulty.
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One other content limitation is that the study will 
use case law from, other industries (medical, aerospace, 
technology, etc...) where it is relevant to the analysis.
The study will work around this limitation by using the
case law for demonstration purposes only.
One delimitation for the work is that we will not
study every federal and state False Claims Act case. 
Currently, the federal cases number 4,281 and have
recovered over 12 billion dollars since 1986 (9:1).
Inclusion of this many case studies would be prohibitive.
Cases will be selected based on the nature of the law that 
they illustrate and as they relate to construction issues.
Nomenclature
• Arbitration: the hearing and determination of a case in 
controversy by an arbiter (a person with power to 
decide a dispute)
• Bounty: a reward, premium, or subsidy especially when 
offered or given by a government: as an extra allowance 
to induce entry into the armed services or a grant to
encourage an industry
• Caltrans: The California Department of Transportation
• CCOs: contract change orders, changes to the original 
contract, which are contracts within themselves
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• Capital Outlays-: are expenditures that result in 
acquisitions of, additions to, replacement of or major 
repairs to fixed assets that will benefit current and 
future fiscal periods. Capital outlays are accounted 
for within the state of California budget
• Claim: is defined as including "...any request or demand, 
whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or
property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or
other
• CPB-: Construction Procedures Bulletin, issued by
Caltrans to keep field engineers updated on latest 
changes in construction procedures
• DRBs: Dispute Review Boards, began in 1990 as a remedy 
for settling claims on construction projects statewide. 
They act as a neutral third party on construction 
conflicts to provide an opinion on the merit of claims 
for large projects
• Dicta: a noteworthy statement: as a formal 
pronouncement of a principle, proposition, or opinion 
or an observation intended or regarded as authoritative 
or a judge’s expression of opinion on a point other 
than the precise issue involved in determining a case
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• Due process: a course of formal proceedings (as legal 
proceedings) carried out regularly and in accordance 
with established rules and principles — called also 
procedural due process or a judicial requirement that 
enacted laws may not contain provisions that result in 
the unfair, arbitrary, or unreasonable treatment of an 
individual — called also substantive due process
• Interest: an excess above what is due or expected or 
feeling that accompanies or causes special attention to 
an object or class of objects or something that arouses
such attention
« Knowing: is having actual knowledge of information, 
acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falseness 
of information. Additionally, knowing means to act in 
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the 
information. From a legal perspective no proof of 
specific intent to defraud is required
• PFCRA: Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act is a mini False 
Claims Act remedy. Useful for small claims, under 
$150,000, enacted in 1986
• Person: includes any natural person, corporation, 
firm, association, organization, partnership, limited 
liability company, business, or trust (4:3)
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• Preponderance: a superiority in weight, power,
importance, or strength or a superiority or excess in 
number or quantity
• Profiteer: one who makes what is considered an
unreasonable profit especially on the sale of essential 
goods during times of emergency
Qui tam’. is short for a Latin phrase, "qui tam pro 
domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," 
which roughly means "...he who brings an action for the 
king as well as for himself. (2:1)"
• Recipient: one that receives
• Rehabilitation: to restore or bring to a condition of 
health or useful and constructive activity
• Seismic: of, subject to, or caused by an earthquake; 
also of or relating to an earth vibration caused by 
something else
• Redressability: is a substantial likelihood that 
the requested relief will remedy the injury
• Relator: For the purposes of the False- Claims Act the 
relator is defined as the individual who brought a case 
of fraud to the attention of the government
• Bipartisan: of, relating to, or involving members of
two (political) parties
14
« Relief-: removal or lightening of something oppressive, 
painful, or distressing (elaborate here based on the
case law)
• STIP: California's State Transportation Improvement 
Program, a seven-year document published by the state,
which dictates the schedule of future construction
projects
« Whistle-blower-: one who reveals something covert or who 
informs against another
15
CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
The literature review will be accomplished 
predominately through the use of case law. The review will 
begin with the historical beginnings of the original 
Federal False Claims legislation. Next relevant amendments 
to the legislation will be surveyed. Applicable case law 
will be used to demonstrate the components of the
legislation. Relevant construction cases will be addressed 
in a separate section.
The California False Claims Act will be included for
its relevance to the organization we are reviewing. A 
history of the California legislation will be added for 
illustration of similarities and differences in the laws.
Finally, additional case law will be employed to
illustrate outcomes of construction fraud cases that are
relevant to the work and the organization.
History of the False Claims Act
"The action originally gained popularity in 13th 
century England" (42) . Most United States laws are based 
on English common law. Common law relies on lawyers to 
represent the client's case. Decisions under common law
16
were made based on prior tradition and precedence. The 
form of reasoning used in common law is known as casuistry 
or case-based reasoning. Common law may be unwritten or
written. The common law, as applied in civil cases was a 
way of compensating the injured party for wrongful acts 
known as torts. (17:1)
As the colonies of the United States formed its new
government after the revolution we relied on European 
history to guide our practice. The Continental Congress in 
the early days of government in the United States enacted
a number of qui tam provisions. Benjamin Franklin has been
quoted as saying: "There is no kind of dishonesty into 
which otherwise good people more easily and frequently 
fall than that of defrauding the government" (2:1).
The Federal False Claims Act being used today passed 
during the American Civil War. The act is commonly 
referred to as the "Lincoln Law" and was passed, by 
Congress on March 2, 1863. This law was enacted out of a 
frustration with poor goods and services being provided to 
the government by dishonest suppliers. During the war, 
boxes of sawdust were being delivered in place of guns, 
and instances of the same horses being sold over and over 
to the Union Army were discovered. One war profiteer
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boasted "You can sell anything to the government at almost 
any price you've got the guts to ask" (4: 1).
The War Department (now known as the Department of
Defense) did not have the resources to track down the
fraudulent suppliers. Additionally, the U. S. Attorney
General Office did not have the staff to attack the
problem. As a result President Abraham Lincoln pushed for 
passage of the False Claims Act. (30:1)
The False Claims Act included "qui tain" provisions 
that allowed private citizens to sue, on the government's 
behalf, companies and individuals that were defrauding the 
government. "Qui tam" is short for a Latin phrase, "qui
tain pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte
sequitur," which roughly means "he who brings an action 
for the king as well as for himself." (30:2) The purpose 
of the False Claims Act was to provide a means to motivate 
private individuals to "blow the whistle" on known cases 
of fraud perpetrated against the government. The 
individual who brought a case of fraud to the attention of 
the government (referred to as the relator in the False 
Claims Act) would be given a percentage of the fines 
imposed on the guilty party.
The penalty for defrauding the government was a two
thousand dollar fine for each false claim plus double the
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amount of the false claims submitted. The relator, who
brought the suit to the attention of the government, 
received 50% of the amount collected plus his legal costs.
In 1943, the Supreme Court ruled in United States ex 
rel. Marcus v. Hess that the relator could bring action
under the Federal Claims Act on behalf of the U.S.
government, even though the action was based solely on 
information acquired from the government. (41:2) This
meant the relator did not need to have first hand
knowledge of the fraud, but simple could use the
information learned from newspaper accounts and government 
records. A number of cases were brought by relators, where 
the information was based solely on government documents, 
congressional hearings and news accounts. As a result the 
False Claims Act was significantly amended in 1946.
The 1946 amendment to the False Claims Act attempted 
to correct the ruling of the Supreme Court. However, it
went too far and made the False Claims Act ineffectual.
The 1946 amendment reduced the percent the relator
received from 50% to 25% (10% if the government joined the 
action). And more significantly, it prohibited lawsuits 
based on evidence or information the government was 
already aware of. This meant, if any government official 
had any knowledge or information regarding the claim, or
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if any government file or record contained any information 
concerning the case, then the relator could not use this 
information when bringing the suit. This was true even if 
the government officials were not investigating the case 
or if the relator was the source of the government 
knowledge. As a result the False Claims Act became 
virtually unusable for the next forty years.
This was true until the mid-1980s, when President 
Reagan proposed a new philosophy. President Reagan 
campaigned on the concept of increased responsibility of 
the private sector, privatization of government functions 
and the use of market forces to enhance government
services. (37:2) President Reagan also dramatically 
increased defense spending, which lead to numerous highly 
publicized cases of over-spending on government contracts. 
The ability of the government officials to administrate 
and control this increase in spending was insufficient due 
to lack of resources and legal tools. Government officials 
also stated it was difficult to get individuals with 
knowledge of fraud to speak up for fear they would lose 
their jobs.
In 1985, the Department of Defense reported that 45 
of the largest 100 defense contractors — including nine 
of the top 10 — were under investigation for multiple
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fraud, offenses." (30:2) In 1986, after high-profile 
hearings revealed that the Department of Defense was 
purchasing $435 claw hammers, $640 toilet seats, and 
$7,600 coffee makers, Congress decided to take action 
(24:2) . It amended the False Claims Act, after 
congressional hearings exposed widespread military 
contractors’ fraud, including defective products, 
substitution of inferior materials and illegal price 
gouging. The 1986 amendment empowered ordinary citizens to
act as private attorneys general by filing qui tarn
whistleblower suits against individuals or entities that 
have defrauded or cheated the government. (5:2)
A bipartisan passage of a series of amendments to 
False Claims Act was put into law on October 27, 1986 (See 
Appendix B). These amendments provided better ability for 
"whistle blowers" to file suit in qui tam cases. Frank
Hunger, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil 
Division praised the work of Senator Charles Grassley of 
Iowa and Representative Howard L. Berman of California, 
who sponsored the 1986 whistle blower provisions (9:1).
In addition, the percent a whistle blower would 
receive was increased to 30% (15% if the government 
partnered in the action). Attorneys were also given 
assurance that their legal fees would be covered in
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successful litigation. Companies filing fraudulent claims,
in addition to paying triple the amount of the claims, can
also be fined $5,000 to $10,000 for each false claim.
Since the passage of the amendments to the False
Claims Act in 1986, the number of cases filed has
increased dramatically. "More than 3,000 qui tam cases
have been filed since 1986." (9:2)
The False Claims Act Law
The United States Code section 3729, Title 31 Money 
and Finance, Subtitle III - Financial Management, Chapter 
37 - Claims, Subchapter III - Claims Against The United 
States Government, Section 3729 - False Claims, states 
"Tiny person who knowingly presents, or causes to be 
presented, to an officer or employee of the United States 
Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United
States Government a false or fraudulent claim for payment 
or approval... is liable to the United States Government for 
a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than 
$10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the 
Government sustains because of the act of that person..."
(24:1) Additionally, any person who conspires to defraud 
the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim 
allowed or paid is liable. Any person who has "has
possession, custody, or control of property or money used,
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or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud 
the Government or willfully to conceal the property, 
delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than 
the amount for which the person receives a certificate or 
receipt" (35:1), is liable. Any person who is authorized 
to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of 
property used, or to be used, by the Government and, 
intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the 
receipt without completely knowing that the information on 
the receipt is true" (35:1), is liable. Any person who 
"knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation 
or debt, public property from an officer or employee of 
the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, who 
lawfully may not sell or pledge the property" (35:1), is 
liable. Any person who "knowingly makes, uses, or causes
to be made or used, a false record or statement to
conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or 
transmit money or property to the Government" (35:1), is
liable.
The term "knowing" is defined by having actual 
knowledge of the information, acts in deliberate ignorance 
of the truth or falsity of information. Additionally, 
"knowing" means to act in reckless disregard of the truth
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or falsity of the information, and no proof of specific 
intent to defraud is required.
The term "claim" is defined as including "...any 
request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, 
for money or property which is made to a contractor, 
grantee, or other recipient..." (35:2) Provided "...the United 
States Government provides any portion of the money or 
property which is requested or demanded, or if the
Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or
other recipient for any portion of the money or property
which is requested or demanded." (35:2)
There are exceptions when "the person committing the
violation of this subsection furnished officials of the
United States responsible for investigating false claims 
violations with all information known to such person about 
the violation within 30 days after the date on which the
defendant first obtained the information." (35:2) This
person must cooperate fully with any Government
investigation. There can be no criminal prosecution, civil
action or administrative action commenced under the title
with respect to violation.
Under section 3730 - Civil actions for false claims, 
the responsibility of enforcement is given to the Attorney 
General. The Attorney General is required to diligently
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investigate any violation. After investigation, the 
Attorney General may bring civil action.
Anybody may bring action for a violation of the False
Claims Act and must do so in their name and in the name of
the Government. Dismissal of the action requires a court 
and the Attorney to give written consent to the dismissal
with reasons for the dismissal. If the Government decides
to proceed with an action, this must be done within 60 
days of receiving the complaint and evidence in the case. 
With good cause the Government may ask for extensions from
the court. If the defendant can show to the court that the
litigation brought by the person is for the purposes of 
harassment the court may limit the participation by the 
person bringing the litigation.
In cases where the Government decides not to proceed 
with the action, the person bringing the litigation shall 
have the right to conduct the action. If the Government 
request the copies of pleadings and transcripts, they 
shall be provided to the Government.
If the Government proceeds with the action, the 
person bringing the action (the relator) shall receive at
least 15% but not more the 25% of the proceeds of the
action. This is true unless the court determines the
findings are primarily based on evidence other than that
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provided by the relator. In this ease, the relator is
entitled to no more than 10%. In addition to the
percentages listed above the relator is entitled to
expenses, plus attorney fees and costs.
If the Government does not proceed with the action,
the relator is entitled to 25% to 30%. The court decides
the amount between 25% and 30% based on the contribution
to the case by the relator..In addition to this
percentage, the relator is entitled to expenses, plus
attorney fees and costs.
In the cases where the defendant prevails in the 
action, the court may award the defendant attorney fees
and costs. This is true when the court finds that the
person bringing the action was clearly vexatious,
frivolous or brought primarily for the purpose of
harassment.
Certain persons are barred by the law in bring 
action. No member of the armed forces may bring an action 
against the armed forces, arising from service in the 
armed forces. No action may be brought against a member of 
Congress, a member of the Judiciary or a senior executive
branch official, if the action is based on information or
evidence known to the Government when the action is
brought. No action may be brought when the Government is
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already a party in the case. No action may be brought 
based on public disclosure, transactions in a criminal 
hearing, civil hearing, administrative hearing, or from 
the news media, unless the action is brought by the 
Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an 
original source of the information.
Tiny person fired, demoted, suspended, threatened, 
harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in 
terms of his employment by his employer due to legal 
actions taken with regard to the False Claims Act, shall 
be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee
whole. This relief shall include reinstatement at the same
level, two times the back pay plus interest and
compensation for any special costs sustained. This
includes any legal fees and costs.
Rules and Procedures
Civil action brought under the False Claims Act may
not be made more than six years after the date the
violation occurred, or an action may not be made more than 
three years after the date the facts of the case are known
or should have been known by an official of the
responsible for taking action, but in no case may an 
action be made ten years after the violation has occurred 
(which ever occurs first). Any case brought under the
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False Claims Act, the United States is required to prove 
all elements of the cause, including damages, by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The rules listed are a
summary and not inclusive.
Civil Investigative Demands 
The Attorney General may demand, when a person is
believed to possess material or information, the
information be produced. The individual must when ordered 
provide written answers to questions involving the 
material or information and give testimony concerning the
material or information. The demands for the material or
information shall include a statement of the nature of the
conduct constituting the alleged violation of the False
Claims Act. The material or information required must be
described with sufficient definiteness to permit the 
material to be fairly identified. The questions, for which 
the answers are to be provided, must be in the form of 
written interrogatories. And any person required to give 
testimony shall be notified of the right to have an 
attorney present. The civil investigative demands
discussed are not inclusive.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
Design of the Investigation
The design of the investigation will be to utilize
the federal and state of California's False Claims Acts'
case reviews included to analyze the Caltrans'
construction claims process. Additionally, to review the 
organizational structure at Caltrans to ascertain if the 
claims made are being handled in the most efficient and 
cost effective way given the organizations resources 
available. Finally, the analysis will review if using the 
legal history of the False Claims Acts can benefit the 
organization as a cost savings tool for arbitrations on 
construction disputes and claims.
The Caltrans' construction claims, arbitration 
reviews and the organizational charts will be studied in 
detail to provide background to complete an analysis on 
the usefulness of the legislation for the organization. 
Many variables will be identified throughout the 
investigation, including procedures already in place 
within the organization and prior legal remedies that the • 
courts have adjudicated.
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Population
The principal characteristics of the population under 
review are the general or primary contractors that obtain
contracts from Caltrans. Also involved are subcontractors,
whom although they do not directly have a contract with 
the organization may also benefit from the state and 
federally funded highway projects that the organization 
inspects and administers.
The sampling of the population will be a quasi- 
experimental in design in that there will be questions 
asked of participants but they will be in an interview 
format and as such will not necessarily be identical for 
each participant. Additionally, most of the analysis will 
be based on historical cost figures as there is always 
time needed to gather and analyze the information provided 
by the organization.
Treatment
The instruments used to gather the research are
varied and consist of phone conversations, one-on-one 
interviews, powerpoint presentations, Internet research, 
legal research and literature reviews. Also used is the 
Governor's budget for the financial component of the 
Caltrans' construction budget and the STIP for the time­
line component of the analysis. Attorney's fees and
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workload analysis will be used to ascertain the cost 
incurred to the organization to prosecute alleged false 
claims under the legislation.
The validity of the instruments will be difficult to 
ascertain since they have not been studied in detail by 
other researchers at this time. Other researchers and
attorneys have reviewed the False Claims legislation and 
they are included to speak to the validity of the work.
Data Analysis Procedures
The procedures used to gather the data are different
for each data source. Data gathered on the case reviews 
may be supplied by legal research organizations such as 
the Taxpayers Against Fraud or by attorney's statements on 
cases defended and prosecuted. All results will be 
verified as possible with the US Attorney General's and 
the Department of Justice's statistics for federal cases. 
For state of California cases the Attorney General's 
office has been consulted for data. Additionally data has 
been gathered from newspaper accounts, publications and
Internet sites on case studies.
Data on construction claims has been gathered from 
the organizations itself. Caltrans' records and 
presentations will be used in the analysis. Published 
documents like organization charts will be used in this
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capacity also. The organizations' Intranet capabilities
will be used to access additional data sources (i.e. forms
and electronic files) as warranted.
The data analysis procedures include calculations on 
the number of false claims both federally and at the state 
level which have been prosecuted. Judgements are reviewed 
to ascertain cost analysis for cases concluded.
Construction statistics from the state are summarized to
show levels of claims made.
Additional data analysis will be performed on Dispute
Review Board statistics. DRB summaries are used to show
claims contested at the state level. Calculations are made
to determine the percentage of favorable outcomes at the
state level from the DRB cases. Illustrative charts and
graphs are included from calculations of relevant
statistics.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CASE LAW
Constitutionality Case Law 
In Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 21, 1997), a Texas District Court ruled the qui tam
provisions of the False Claims Act were unconstitutional. 
This decision was contradictory to many years of court 
decisions regarding constitutionality of the False Claims 
Act. According to the Judge in the case, Congress cannot 
"confer standing upon a qui tam plaintiff who has suffered 
no cognizable injury under Article III of the Constitution 
. . . consistent with principles of 'separation of 
powers.'" (12:1) The district court analysis included a 
description of the constitutional requirements for 
standing. Quoting three elements of standing under Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) :
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in
fact" — an invasion of a legally protected interest which 
is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or 
imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.''' Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of ... Third, it must be "likely " as
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opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be
"redressed by a favorable decision."
Additionally, the court decided that "prudential 
requirements also bear on standing." Therefore, according 
to the court a plaintiff must "assert his own legal rights 
and interests and not those of third parties." (35:3)
The Texas District Court based its' decision on 
a critique and rejection of the 9th Circuit's analysis and 
holding in U.S. ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co. 9 F.3d 743 
(9th Cir. 1993), which up held the constitutionality of 
the qui tam provisions based on the assignment theory. The 
assignment theory is that the Government may assign its' 
interest in the case to a "relator", through the False
Claims Act.
"First, the district court rejected the Kelly court's 
finding that, in addition to the Government as "the real 
party in interest" meeting the injury requirement, the 
relator also meet it by having a personal stake in the 
outcome of the suit. While the Kelly court found that the 
relator must "fund the prosecution of the suit," he is 
eligible to receive "a sizeable bounty if he prevails," 
and "may be liable for costs if the suit is found to be 
frivolous," the district court rejected these as merely 
"byproducts" of the litigation that fail to evidence
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injury in fact." (35:3) The Texas District Court also 
determined the assignment theory assumes Congress assigned
the Government's interest and injury to a qui tam relator
fails for three reasons. The first being there was "no 
indication in the statute that Congress was attempting to 
bestow a contract right to recover damages on the qui tam 
plaintiffs, who were not even identified at the time of 
passage, and are not identifiable until they themselves 
initiate a suit." Second to effectively assign a contract 
right, "the owner of that right must manifest an intention 
to make a present transfer of the right without further 
action by the owner or by the obligor." However, according 
to the Texas District Court, Congress is not given the 
power to prosecute fraud cases. Based on the
Constitutional separation of powers, "Congress is
powerless to distribute powers that it does not have". 
Additionally, common law does not allow assignment of in 
the future rights as recognizable. "There must be a 
'present transfer of an existing right'". Third, 
permitting relators to suit on behalf of the Government 
"would effectively permit Congress to circumvent...standing 
assigning a governmental cause of action to an individual. 
"The court found that, in light of standing being an 
integral part of our system of separation of powers,
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Congress should not be allowed to legislatively circumvent 
Article Ill's standing requirements". (35:4)
The Texas District Court also rejected precedence in 
previous False Claims Act cases which upheld 
constitutionality of "Congress simply extended the Article
III standing to [relators] under the statute" by creating 
a legal interest in the statute and conferring the 
standing to assert it. The Texas District Court stated the 
Supreme Court has rejected theory that a statutory right 
eliminates the need for "injury in fact." "Injury in fact 
is not a prudential requirement that can be discarded by 
passage of legislation, and the Article III inquiry cannot 
turn on the source of the asserted right." (35:4) The 
Texas District Court also discounted Supreme Court dicta 
presumably approving of the qui tam provisions, finding 
that it predated the "Courts modern conception of 
standing." The long history of the qui tam provisions did 
not persuade the court, as proof of its'
constitutionality. The Texas District Court stated that 
"Article Ill's requirements are clear, and are not to be 
avoided by courts eager to uphold the constitutionality of 
congressional enactments." (35:4)
"In short, the district court concluded that the
relator suffered no injury in fact nor did she show any
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'causal' link between an injury (even if there were one)
and the conduct complained of. Further, 'Congress cannot 
statutorily assign the Executive's future interest in 
pursuing a particular fraud claim to an unnamed 
theoretical plaintiff.' Otherwise, Congress would 
'circumvent Article III standing requirements, which are 
essential to the principle of a limited judicial role 
under our separation of powers.'" (36:18)
Another Texas District Court disagreed with the
unconstitutionality of the qui tam provision of the False
Claims Act in U. S. ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia / HCA
Healthcare Corp, et al., Order, Civil Action No. C-95-110
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 1998). The court rejected the
defendant's assertion that the qui tam provision of the
False Claims Act was unconstitutional. The "relator James
Thompson, M.D., alleged that Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Corporation and certain affiliated entities created 
incentive arrangements and provided financial inducements 
to physicians for patient referrals in violation of the 
anti-kickback statute and self-referral laws." (36:18) The
court first considered the constitutionality of the qui 
tam provisions. The court decided contrary to a decision 
reached earlier that year in the same district by another
court. This court disagreed with the ruling in Riley v.
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St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, "’because it goes against
134 years of case law specifically concluding or assuming 
that the qui tam provisions are constitutional and/or that 
the relator has standing to bring the action even though 
the relator has suffered no injury.' The court instead
concurred with the numerous circuit courts that have
addressed the issue and found the qui tam provisions to be
constitutional. Citing other circuit decisions, the court 
noted that where the Government has suffered an injury-in­
fact, the relator merely steps in as its representative or
assignee to carry out the statute's purpose of remedying 
fraud against the Government. Moreover, the FCA provides 
sufficient executive control of the qui tam suit and the 
relator has a personal stake in the outcome of his suit. 
The court also observed that ’appellate courts scrutinize 
their jurisdiction before reviewing the issues of each 
case, and none, including the Supreme Court, in ruling on 
FCA cases has yet determined that it lacked jurisdiction 
because an FCA qui tam relator lacked standing.'" (36:18)
Again in U.S. ex rel. Olloh-Okeke v. Home Care
Services Inc. a " Texas district court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss Clara Olloh-Okeke's qui tam 
suit on constitutional..." (21:16) This court, explicitly 
rejected the Texas court's ruling in U.S. ex rel. Riley v.
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St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, 982 F.Supp. 1261 (S.D.Tex.
1997), and instead relied on the opinion by Judge Harmon 
in U.S. ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA, 20 F.Supp.2d 
1017, 1044-46 (S.D.Tex. 1998), stating that "[ t] his 
court joins Judge Harmon and every other federal appellate 
court that has considered the issue in disagreeing with 
Riley because it goes against 134 years of case law 
specifically concluding or assuming that the qui tam 
provisions are constitutional." (41:16) And once again in 
Hopkins v. Actions, Incorporated of Brazoria County, 1997
WL 789429 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 1997) another Texas district
court "held that a plaintiff need not have standing as a
relator to utilize the FCA § 3730(h) retaliation
provision. Furthermore, in an express rejection of its own
district's recent decision in U.S. ex rel. Riley v. St.
Luke's Episcopal Hospital, the court alternatively held 
that the plaintiff did have constitutional standing as a 
relator. The court stated "In light of the congressional 
purpose underlying the FCA and its plain language, this 
court rejects the St. Luke's reasoning. Moreoever, a close
reading of Robertson reveals that the Fifth Circuit finds 
the standing question to be a non-issue on these facts. 
Indeed, in one of the few cases addressing the standing of
a qui tam plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit (in U.S. ex rel.
39
Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir.
1977)) described the FCA as a statute that 'grants
informers standing to sue and an award for successful
action under the statute.'" (21:16)
In U.S. ex rel. Fallon et al. v. Accudyne Corp, and
Alliant Techsystems, Inc., the defendants argued that the
relators again lacked standing because the controversy was
between the United States and the defendants. The relators
had not suffered injury in fact. The defendants also
argued again that the qui tam provisions of the False
Claims Act violated the separation of powers' principles. 
The defendants also argued, the Appointments Clause of
Article II commands that the President "shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed." Lastly, the
defendants cited a case which held that private attorneys 
appointed 'must be personally disinterested in criminal 
prosecution. Therefore, the defendants claimed that the 
due process clause is violated by permitting private 
citizens with an interest in the outcome of the proceeding
to prosecute claims on behalf of the United States. The 
court disagreed with each of the arguments, finding that 
standing was not at issue since the real party in interest 
was the United States, which simply assigned its right to 
sue to the relators. Further, since relators were
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advancing their own funds in prosecution of the suit and 
were entitled to receive a share of any recovery, there 
was "a direct and adversarial controversy" between 
relators and defendants. With respect to the Appointment 
Clause of Article II, the court found that, given the
substantial control the Government retains over a
relator's action, executive power is not improperly 
usurped and relators are not vested with sufficient 
authority to be deemed "officers of the United States."
And finally with respect to a possible violation of the 
due process clause, the court again rejected the argument, 
stating "the cited authority involved criminal (not civil) 
prosecutions and did not suggest that appointing a 
prosecutor with an interest in the litigation's outcome 
rose to the level of a due process violation." (21-:16)
In U.S. ex rel. Fallon et al. v. Accudyne Corp, and
Alliant Techsystems, Inc., the defendants also argued that
since the case involved alleged no compliance with
environment provisions of the contract, the violations did
not threaten a financial interest. The district court also
rejected the defendants' argument that the suit "was not 
supportable because the U.S. was not exposed to any 
financial risk as a result of Accudyne's alleged failure 
to comply with the environmental compliance provisions.
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The court stated: 'If such provisions are to have effect 
their knowing violation must have the potential to support 
FCA claims even though violations do not threaten a 
financial interest. Accordingly, courts have consistently
held that damage to the financial interests of the
government is not a prerequisite to a FCA claim.'" (21:16)
However, in U.S. ex red. Minnesota Association of
Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health System Corp, et al., 
Opinion and Order, No. 4-96-734 (D. Minn. March 16, 1999),
"a Minnesota district court ruled that a relator lacks
constitutional standing where the Government has not
suffered economic damages. According to the court, if the 
Government has not suffered economic injury, it does not 
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for Article III 
standing, and therefore has no standing to assign to a qui
tam relator." (36:1)
The Supreme Court decided two constitutional issues
in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. U.S. ex rel.
Stevens, 120 S.Ct. 1858 (May 22, 2000). The first was
whether or not a qui tam relator can suit (has standing)
on behalf of the United States. And second whether or not
a State can be considered a "person" and a defendant in a
false claims suit.
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The Court unanimously ruled that the relator, 
Stevens, met Article Ill's standing requirements. Article 
III of the U. S. Constitution, requires a plaintiff must 
establish "an injury-in-fact. This injury-in-fact must be
"concrete" and "actual or imminent". It can not be of
conjectural or hypothetical basis. Additionally the 
causation must be fairly traceable, with a connection 
between the injury-in-fact and the conduct of the 
defendant. Also, in order for there to be standing, there 
must be redressability. Redressability is a substantial 
likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the 
plaintiff's injury. Stevens argued and the court agreed 
that his qui tam suit provided remedy for injury suffered 
by the United States. The court found the injury to the 
United States sovereignty, due to violation of its' law 
and alleged fraud injured the United States proprietarily
Regarding the assignment and recovery by the relator 
Stevens, "The Court also found that the portion of the
Government's recovery Stevens could receive upon
prevailing constituted a concrete private interest in the 
outcome of the suit. Stating, however, that "[ t] he 
interest must consist of obtaining compensation for, or 
preventing, the violation of a legally protected right,"
the Court stressed that the concrete interest must be
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related to the injury-in-fact. As Stevens' right to his 
share of the Government's recovery could not fully 
materialize until the litigation was over, this interest 
would be merely a "byproduct" of the suit and would not 
serve to obtain compensation for or prevent a violation to 
a legally protected right." (39:2) Additionally, thet
Supreme Court found adequate basis for standing by Stevens 
as relator, and the assignment theory. The court stated 
the False Claims Act "can reasonably be regarded as 
effecting a partial assignment of the Government's damages 
claim." (39:2) In making it's ruling the "Court heavily 
relied upon the qui tam concept's grounding in English and 
American legal history. The Court stated: [H] istory is 
particularly relevant to the constitutional standing 
inquiry since ..Article Ill's restriction of the judicial 
power to "Cases" and "Controversies" is properly
understood to mean "cases and controversies of the sort
traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial 
process." The Court observed that qui tam actions in 
various forms have been a part of English legal tradition 
since the end of the 13th century, when private 
individuals sued to vindicate royal interests as well as
their own. The Court also recognized the qui tam tradition
in the American legal system, noting particularly its use
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immediately before and after the framing of the
Constitution. Referring to qui tarn's historical roots, the
Court concluded its analysis of this issue by stating-: 
"When combined with the theoretical justification for 
relator standing discussed earlier, it leaves no room for
doubt that a qui tam relator under the FCA has Article III
standing." (39:2)
Regarding the issue of whether or not a State is a 
"person" and can be held liable under the False Claims
Act, the Supreme Court decided in a split decision that:
"a state or state agency is not a "person" subject to qui 
tam liability under § 3729 of the False Claims Act."
(39:4) The False Claims Act states "[ a]ny person who 
knowingly presents or causes to be presented, to an 
officer or employee of the United States Government ... a 
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval." And 
the Court, looking- at a "longstanding presumption that the 
term person does not include the sovereign, the Court 
found no affirmative showing of congressional intent to
the contrary in the FCA. The Court stated-: 'The
presumption is particularly applicable where it is claimed 
that Congress subjected the States to liability to which 
they had not been subject before.' According to the Court, 
the FCA as originally enacted in 1863 'bore no indication
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that States were subject to its penalties' and none of the 
subsequent amendments to the statute, including the 1986 
amendments, suggested a broadening of the term person." 
(39:5). The Supreme Court supported it's findings using 
three aspects of the False Claims Act language. First, the 
language requires the Attorney General to investigate 
demands to "any person" with information regarding a False 
Claims Act violation. In this case the language expands 
the definition of "any person" to include states, while
the False Claims Act liability provisions contain no 
reference to states being included as "any person".
Second, the Court interpreted the False Claims Act as 
"essentially punitive in nature," therefore cannot be 
imposed on government entities. And third, prior to the 
1-986 Amendment to the False Claims Act the Program Fraud 
Civil Remedies Act (PFCRA) was enacted which specifically 
does not include states as subject to liability. The 
Supreme Court stated it would be "most peculiar" to 
"subject states to the damages and penalties provisions of 
the False Claims Act while exempting them from the smaller 
damages imposed under the PFCRA. The Court found further 
support for its holding in two doctrines of statutory 
construction. The Court applied the ordinary rule of 
statutory construction known as the clear statement rule,
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which holds that 'if Congress intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between States and the Federal
Government, it must make its intention to do so
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.' 
Reiterating its finding that Congress did not manifest 
such an intent in the FCA, the Court moved on to the
second doctrine, which holds that 'statutes should be
construed so as to avoid difficult constitutional
questions.' Of this the Court stated-: 'We of course
express no view on the question whether an action in
federal court by a qui tam relator against a State would
run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment, but we note that
there is 'serious doubt' on that score.'" (39:3)
Two dissenting votes by Justices Stevens'and Souter 
disagreed that a State could not be considered a "person" 
in a qui tam lawsuit. In their opinion they stated "[t]he
False Claims Act is ... all-embracing in scope, national in 
its purpose, and as capable of being violated by state as 
by individual action." "...when Congress uses" persons "...in 
federal statutes enforceable by the Federal Government or 
by a federal agency, it applies to States and state 
agencies as well as to private individuals and
corporations." (39:3)
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While the Supreme Court concluded that an individual 
in a qui tam action cannot sue a state, the Court did not
decided decide whether or not a suit could be brought by 
the United States against a state. Justice Ginsburg stated 
"the clear statement rule applied to private suits against 
a State has not been applied when the United States is the 
plaintiff." therefore "I read the Court's decision to 
leave open the question whether the word 'person'
encompasses States when the United States itself sues
under the False Claims Act." (39:5)
Also unresolved, by the Supreme Court is whether or 
not municipalities, municipal agencies, counties and other 
local government entities can be considered "persons" and 
liable under the False Claims Act. Additionally, no 
resolution was made whether a State or local "proprietary" 
or "independent" entity can be sued and whether or not 
State or other government employees can be sued as 
"persons" under the False Claims Act.
Public Disclosure Bare and Original 
Source Case Law
Section 3730 of the False Claims Act requires the 
relator to be the original source of false claim 
information in a qui tam suit, and the information can not
be disclosed publicly previous to the suit. In U.S. ex
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rel. Grayson et al. v. Advanced Management Technology et 
al., the 4th Circuit court dismissed the case based on 
both, that the relator was not the original source and the 
false claim information was previously disclosed publicly.
In this case the false claim information was derived from
an administrative complaint previously filed with the FAA 
by an unsuccessful bidder of the government contract. The 
court also held the relator "Grayson and Hoffman", who 
were acting as attorneys for the Camber Corporation were 
not the original source and the information provided by 
others was insufficient as "direct" and "independent" 
knowledge as required by the statute. (41:1)
In U.S. ex rel. Hansen v. Cargill, Inc. et al., the
Shell Oil Litigation Settlement Trustee Committee
purchased 10,000 acres in the San Francisco North Bay area 
(known as the Napa Salt Marshes) for $10 million. The 
purchase was a litigation settlement for environmental 
preservation. The relator, Hansen, filed the suit against 
Cargill Inc., and its appraisers stating Cargill Inc., 
defrauded the United States by submitting a $34 million
public interest value on the land. Hansen asserted the
land had a negative value due to environmental clean up
that would be necessary at the Napa Salt Marshes. The
California district court ruled the relator did not have
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"direct knowledge" and did not meet the original source 
requirements of the False Claims Act, because the 
information presented had been publicly disclosed by the 
news media. The court made this ruling while acknowledging
the relator had been the source of the disclosure to the
media. (41:2) .
In U.S. ex rel. Coleman v. State of Indiana et al.,
an Indiana district court decided that the public
disclosure bar of the False Claims Act included state
administrative proceedings and hearings. The court
dismissed the case stating his was not the original 
source, since the Indiana General Assembly, Administrative
Rules Oversight Committee met and discussed a similar 
compliant previous to the Coleman suit.
In U.S. ex rel. Downy v. Corning, Inc. et al., a New
Mexico district court ruled in favor of the relator and
that a general public discussion did not meet the public
disclosure bar. "The court ruled that the disclosure did
not trigger the bar pursuant to the test established in 
U.S. ex rel. Springfield terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14
F.3d 645, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1994), which held that Congress 
intended to prohibit qui tam actions "only when either the 
allegations of fraud or the critical elements of the 
fraudulent transaction themselves [are] in the public
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domain." (41:4) In Downy the New Mexico court decided the
general public discussion did not disclose the allegations 
of fraud, but only involved questions of policy. "The 
relator's complaint was not ’based upon' the public 
disclosure despite the fact that it involved the same 
general subject matter." (41:4)
Government Intervention Case Law
In U.S. ex rel. Newsham and Bloem v. Lockheed 
Missiles and Space Company, Inc. r the 11th Circuit Court 
Stated "once a qui tam suit is filed, the Government has 
sixty days to choose one of only two options: to intervene 
and proceed with the action, or to decline intervention.
If the Government elects the former, it may control the 
prosecution of the case, subject to the relator 's right 
to continue as a party and to obtain a hearing and court 
approval regarding any settlement or dismissal of the 
action." (21:12) In this case "the relator's share is 15 
to 25 percent of the recovery. On the other hand, if the 
Government chooses to decline, the relator has the right 
to conduct the action subject to the Government's right to 
intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause, 
and the relator is entitled to 25 to 30 percent of the
recovery." However in this case the court found "The
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government has from the beginning flagrantly and
repeatedly violated the provisions of the statute." To 
begin with, the Government failed either to intervene or 
notify the court of its declination to do so within sixty 
days of its receipt of the complaint, and, "[w]ithout
under-taking either of these authorized alternatives, the 
government succeeded in having Williams' complaint 
erroneously dismissed on a jurisdictional issue." Second, 
"in flagrant disregard of the statute," the Government did 
not seek leave of court to intervene or make a showing of 
good cause before settling with NEC. Finally, the 
Government failed either to notify Williams of the 
settlement or to seek court approval for it. "In settling 
with NEC, the government brazenly ignored both Williams' 
right to a hearing and the statutory prerequisite of court 
authorization." The 11th Circuit also "held that the FCA 
does not contain a general prohibition against government
employees filing qui tam suits and that the §3730(e)(4) 
public disclosure bar did not apply to Williams' lawsuit." 
(21:13)
The Government in the case "argued that the court did 
not have jurisdiction to award Williams a statutory share 
of the settlement because the Government was not a 'party' 
to the action. The Government further argued that Williams
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had no entitlement because the facts of the case did not
fall into either of the qui tam recovery provisions set 
out in §3730(d). That is, (d)(1) was inapplicable because 
the Government did not 'proceed with [the] action,' and 
(d)(2) was inapplicable because Williams did not 'collect 
the civil penalty and damages.'" (21:13) The Government
also maintained that its settlement with NEC was not a
settlement of Williams' qui tam action. And that Williams
had not make the case that the settlement included the
claims in his complaint. "The 11th Circuit characterized 
the Government's arguments as 'specious' and as an attempt 
'to take advantage of its blatant violations of the
statute.'" (21:13)
The court ruled that the Government's settlement with
NEC was an "intervention" in the lawsuit within the
meaning of the FCA. Further, the settlement effectively 
terminated the lawsuit, except for the determination of 
Williams' statutory compensation of between 15 and 25 
percent (as well as attorneys' fees and expenses). The 
court ruled that Williams was entitled to 15 percent of 
the $34 million settlement. "While noting that the 
district court generally determines the relator's exact 
percentage, the 11th Circuit concluded that it should 
determine the relator's share on the record before it
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'[i]n light of Williams' death and the government's head 
in the sand, arbitrariness in opposing Williams' efforts 
to preserve his testimony." (21:13)
California's False Claims Act
Twelve states nationwide as of 2003 have False Claims
Legislation. These are: Nevada, Hawaii, Texas, Washington, 
Louisiana, Arkansas, Florida, Tennessee, Virginia,
Massachusetts, Illinois and California (22:2). The
California Law was enacted in 1987. The law is similar to
the federal legislation that it was modeled from, but is 
designed to protect the state of California not the 
federal government (6:1).
When the law was passed, there was a perception that
there was an increase in fraud at the state and local
government levels and that this legislation would protect 
the state. The California legislation addresses false 
claims against the state or any political subdivision. 
"This is the most important aspect of the California Act: 
that claims brought on behalf of such entities as city and 
county governments, public schools and colleges, and 
special transportation districts may all be brought under 
the Act’s provisions (26:4). The legislature meant for 
this to have the broadest possible construction to benefit 
the public interest.
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Although modeled, after the federal legislation there 
are some significant differences between them (11:101).
The California False Claims Act includes local public 
funds and can involve both state and local programs.
Additionally, the California False Claims Act is not 
exclusive, thereby allowing other legal remedies to be 
sought (28:3).
The federal government has benefited enormously from 
the federal False Claims Act. In 1992, for example, a
settlement was reached in a qui tam whistleblower case
that recovered $110 million from National Health
Laboratories (NHL). NHL had billed the Medicare program 
for medically unnecessary tests. The case was initiated 
when an employee of a competitor’s lab tipped off the 
government through a qui tam whistleblower notice to the 
attorney general. The ensuing investigation of NHL 
revealed irregular billing practices from other 
laboratories as well, and a four-year examination of the 
independent laboratories turned up $800 million in damages 
and penalties. When the federal government announced
completion of a settlement with the Healthcare Corporation 
of America, the largest operator of private hospitals in 
the country, bringing the total recovery from that 
company, including penalties and sanctions, to almost $2
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billion. (1:3). That case started with a private complaint 
of the type that the whistleblower act so appropriately 
encourages, this outcome is the type that California 
legislators hope to achieve.
Although the California law lay dormant for most of 
the 1980s, in the 1990s the public sector felt inundated 
by a barrage of unjustified claims and began to use the 
California False Claims Act as a defensive measure (42:2).
In a case regarding Toshiba, the office of the Attorney 
General recently recovered $1.7 million from a vendor who
used false documents to defraud the state in a computer 
purchase (29:1). In another CFCA case, the Deputy City 
Attorney in San Francisco was the lead Deputy on the case
of Stull v. Bank of America — a major false claims (qui 
tarn) lawsuit against the bank on behalf of San Francisco 
and 300 other municipal entities. This case resulted in a 
settlement of $200 million. This is the largest settlement 
in history under California’s False Claims Act (3:3).
"California's attorney general, for example, is 
investigating fraud in a wide range of government 
programs; prison construction projects are particularly 
ripe for fraud. Construction vendors in California have 
been known to substitute inferior products and fail to 
provide promised equipment (29:1)".
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It is not unusual for public-project subcontractors 
and second-tier suppliers to write off such laws on the 
theory that they are not providing labor or materials 
directly to a governmental body and, therefore, they are 
not submitting claims for payment to a governmental body.
As demonstrated in City of Pomona v. Superior Court, 89 
Cal. App. 4th 793 (2001), however, contractors and 
suppliers do not need a direct contractual relationship 
with a governmental body to be found liable under a False
Claims Act.
In City of Pomona, a supplier in California sold
piping and other water distribution parts through
catalogues provided to distributors. In its catalogues, 
the supplier represented that its products complied with 
certain industry corrosion standards. In 1991, without 
modifying the representations in its catalogues, the 
supplier began selling piping and other parts that failed
to meet these corrosion standards.
Over the next six years, the City of Pomona purchased 
the supplier's products from a distributor through the 
supplier's catalogues. After the city learned that the 
catalogues' representations concerning compliance with 
industry standards were false, the city brought an action
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against the supplier for allegedly violating the
California False Claims Act ("the Act").
At trial, the court found no violation of the Act, 
holding that the city had failed to prove the supplier 
submitted a false claim because the supplier’s false 
representations were made generally in its catalogues, not 
specifically within the city’s purchase orders or the 
distributors' invoices to the city. Upon dismissal of its 
action, the city appealed the trial court's ruling to the
California Court of Appeals.
The appellate court rejected the trial court's 
decision and restored the city's action. Noting that
California's Act is based on the federal False Claims Act,
the court first concluded that, like the federal Act,
California's Act was intended to reach all types of fraud 
that might result in financial loss to government. To 
violate the Act, a claim submitted to a governmental
entity need not be false itself so long as it is
underpinned by fraud. Therefore, according to the court, a 
person may be liable for presenting a false claim for 
payment under the Act even though the person did not 
directly apply for or obtain any government funds.
The court then considered and rejected the supplier's
defense that it was not liable under the Act because it
58
had no knowledge that the city would be the end user of 
products it supplied to its distributors. The court found 
that, because the supplier intended to attract customers 
such as the city with its catalogues and sales literature, 
the supplier was liable for the fruits of its marketing.
In the court's eyes, no other finding would serve the 
purposes of the Act.
Finally, examining the circumstances presented in 
City of Pomona, the appellate court held that, by taking
orders for the materials advertised in its catalogues and 
supplying distributors with such materials for purchase by 
the city, the supplier caused its distributors to submit 
false claims for payment to the city. The court reasoned
that the distributors' claims were false for two reasons.
First, the city would not have entered into a contract 
with the distributors to buy the supplier's products had 
it known that the supplier's products did not meet 
industry standards. Second, while the distributors billed 
the city for products the city ordered from the
catalogues, the products that the city received and paid 
for did not match the specifications in those catalogues.
Although City of Pomona deals specifically with 
California's False Claims Act, there is good reason to 
believe that other states, particularly those whose laws
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are based on the federal Act, would also construe their 
laws to extend liability to persons or entities that have 
no contractual relationship with, or do not directly 
present claims to, a governmental body. Accordingly, 
contractors and suppliers who indirectly furnish services 
or materials to public bodies need to be as careful about 
submitting claims for payment as though they were 
submitting such claims to the government itself.
In 1997, the legislature amended the California False 
Claims Act with Assembly Bill 2678 written by Figueroa 
(29:3). This amendment limits the privilege areas. This 
amendment will create a more powerful weapon in fighting
claims fraud.
In addition to the California False Claims Act being 
modeled after the federal legislation a new California
insurance fraud law is also modeled after the federal
False Claims Act. "In what is being called a landmark 
fraud decision" a California jury ordered payment of 8.2
million dollars to Allstate Insurance Company from a group
of doctors and clinics accused of false billing practices
(47:1) .
"A July 1996 Court of Appeals decision, Stacy &
Witbeck, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 47 Cal. 
App. 4th 1, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (1996) held that the
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litigation privilege does not apply to protect statements 
made in the contract claim submission process. In that 
case, Stacy and Witbeck was a contractor to the City of 
San Francisco on a municipal project. Stacy and Witbeck 
was encouraged by the City engineering staff to submit 
documentation in support of its claims, in anticipation of 
settlement discussions. Stacy and Witbeck submitted the
documentation, the claims were denied, and the contractor 
filed litigation. The City contended that the claims 
submitted were false, and filed a cross-complaint against 
the contractor alleging violation of the False Claims Act 
and seeking treble damages and other penalties. Stacy and 
Witbeck sought dismissal of the cross-complaint on the 
grounds that the claims submission process was undertaken 
in anticipation of litigation, and was therefore 
privileged. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that, 
while one purpose of the contract claims submission was 
anticipation of litigation, the litigation privilege did 
not apply because there was an independent purpose, i.e. 
Stacy and Witbeck's compliance with the contract 
requirements. The effect of this case was to strip the 
contractor from immunity for False Claim liability for
statements and claims made in the course of a contractual
claims submission procedure" (29:7).
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In an interesting California case, LeVine v Weis
(1998), a teacher at a Ventura County juvenile home school 
facility was terminated from his employment. LeVine, the 
teacher felt that this arose due to his complaints that
the school site was understaffed and as a result he wound
up responsible for 90 to 120 students. The jury found 
Weis, the County Superintendent of Schools liable for 
violation of the False Claims Act. The jury awarded 
LeVine $350,000 for emotional distress, $86,158 for lost 
back pay and $50,000 for other economic loss. The trial
court doubled the award of back pay and added interest
pursuant to section 12653, subdivision (c). The total 
award was $627,207. Also given to the plaintiff was 
$241,975 for attorney's and court fees (41:3). This is 
significant in that it demonstrates the level of relief 
awarded and also allows that the Superintendent (a public 
entity employee) was a person as defined by the act.
Construction Contracts, Relevant Case Law
In the case of the United States versus Azzarelli
Construction Company in 1981 the defendants allegedly 
rigged a bid on a state highway project. The case involved
a federal act under which the United States contributed a
fixed sum to each state for highway construction. The
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court held that the defendants did not present a claim 
’upon or against the government of the United States. "The
court reasoned that even if the defendants defrauded a
federal grantee, the federal government contributed 
nothing more to the state as a result" (33, 4). Since the
state and not the federal government suffered the fraud
this case was dismissed.
In United States ex rel. Ashol Bhatnagar v. Kiewit 
Pacific Co., State of California, Department of
Transportation, a U.S. District Court for Northern
California dismissed the case. The False Claims Act
relator, Ashok Bhatnagar, sued both entities based on 
claims made by Kiewit to the Department of Transportation 
(Caltrans), paid by the Caltrans, submitted by Caltrans 
for Federal reimbursement, and for retaliation by Caltrans
toward Bhatnagar.
Bhatnagar argued the claim submitted by Kiewit for 
stormwater protection cost should not have been paid as 
extra work to the original contract, because the original 
contract included providing stormwater protection. 
Bhatnagar quoted the contract special provisions, which 
stated the cost for providing stormwater protection
measures were included in the contract and that no
additional compensation would be provided for the costs.
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Bhatnagar also argued that Caltrans submitted these costs
for federal reimbursement as traffic control work and
Caltrans retaliated against him for "whistleblowing". The 
federal government did not join in the suit against Kiewit
or Caltrans.
The District Court decided that since the California
Regional Water Quality Board mandated more stringent
control of stormwater runoff after the contract had been
signed, the claim was not a false claim issue but a
contract dispute issue. The court also decided that since 
Caltrans was a state entity, it was not liable for 
submitting the cost for federal reimbursement under the 
False Claims Act, nor liable regarding the False Claims 
Act provision regarding retaliation. The District Court
based its' decision on Vermont Agency of Natural Resources
v. United States ex rel. Stevens, where the Supreme Court
held states are not liable under the False Claims Act in
actions by private individuals. The District Court
expanded on Stevens, in that states are not liable
regarding the provisions of retaliation in the False
Claims Act (34:1).
In U.S. ex rel. Shaw v. AAA Engineering & Drafting, 
Inc. et al., a 10th Circuit court found the defendant 
liable under the False Claims Act for not complying with
64
the environmental requirements of the contract. In a 
contract with the Tinker Air Force Base, AAA Engineering & 
Drafting, Inc. agreed to provide photographer services.
The contract required the photographic operations to 
provide an Environmental Protection Agency regulation for 
disposal of film processing solution. AAA was required to 
remove all traces of silver from the solution prior to 
disposal. The suit alleged AAA did not perform the silver 
recovery, yet invoiced for full payment of the contract. 
AAA argued they only billed for the fixed price of the 
contract, there was no misrepresentation and therefore 
could not be held liable for fraudulent billing. "The 
court found, however, that ASA had implied certification 
with each monthly invoice that it complied with the silver 
recovery provisions of its contract with the Government. 
The court reasoned that because the contract required AAA 
to practice silver recovery in its laboratory, AAA was 
being paid not only for photography services but also for 
environmental compliance." (41:7) The court held that by 
falsely certifying (with the monthly billing) A7A had 
express or implied compliance. "The court cited to a 
statement by the Senate Judiciary Committee at the time of
the amendments: '[A false claim under the FCA] may take 
many forms, the most common being a claim for goods and
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services not provided, or provided in violation of
contract terms, specification, statute, or regulation.'" 
(41:7) Additionally, "the court found that the language of 
§ 3729(a) (1) supports the theory of implied false
certification. Whereas § 3729(a)(2) premises liability on 
the presentation of a 'false record or statement to get a 
false or fraudulent claim paid or approved', liability 
under the language of § 3720(a)(1) does not require
evidence of a false record or statement." (41:8) The court
admitted contradictory judgements in other cases, however 
in this case AAA clearly knew they were not adhering to 
the silver recovery requirements, yet submitted invoices 
for full payment of the contract. And any negative 
precedence could easily be differed from the facts in this 
case. The defendant also argued that since the Government 
had access to the work orders, the Government knew of the 
failure to comply with the environmental requirements. 
Therefore, there could be no fraud or intent to violate 
the False Claims Act. The court acknowledged that when the 
Governments knowledge is extensive, there could not be, as 
a matter of law, the state of mind to warrant falsity in 
the payment invoice. However, in this case there was not 
extensive knowledge by the Government of the non- 
compliance. And the Governments alleged acknowledge did
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not negate the evidence that AAA knowingly submitted false 
billing based on full compliance of the contract. (41:5)
California Superior Court judge Joseph Katlin found 
in favor of the Los Angles Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (MTA) in a FCA case against Tutor-Saliba
Corporation. The construction contract, to build the 
subway and subway stations, required numerous contract 
change orders for ambiguities and omissions in the 
contract plans and specifications. Many of the requests 
for additional compensation for work in 1995 were made,
however Tutor-Saliba sued the MTA for 19.5 million dollars
in unpaid claims . The MTA responded with a FCA suit in 
1999 and was awarded 29.5 million. The judge imposed
additional awards of 2.4 million and another 34 million
was litigated for legal fees (33:3). The award was made
due to false submittals of bills for extra work, lack of
cooperation in turning over bidding documentation and
improper listing of subcontractors (41:1).
The MTA joined in on a FCA suit against Shea-Kiewit- 
Kenny (SKK), requesting nearly $100 million in damages. 
"The agency has accused SKK of improperly using low-grade 
wooden wedges, which failed to meet strength requirements 
specified in its contract, between segments of its 
concrete tunnel linings". Additionally the MTA accused SKK
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of regularly filling spaces between tunnel liner segments 
with trash, wood scraps and plaster. According to the 
attorney for the relator Buffington, Shea-Kiewit-Kenny 
(SKK) "consistently sought more ways for billing money for 
doing less" (34:3). The MTA fired SKK in July of 1995, 
when a portion of the Hollywood Boulevard over the tunnel 
work sank into a large sinkhole. Buffington, an employee 
of the contract management firm Parsons-Dillingham, 
brought the FCA suit and the MTA joined in the action. 
Buffington stated in an interview that he tried to tell 
his bosses at Parsons-Dillingham and executives at the MTA 
that SKK billed for work not completed and billed for 
materials and equipment it never used. When they failed to 
take legal action against the builder, Buffington decided 
to file the FCA suit. "I was paid to ensure that taxpayers 
got what they paid for..." said Buffington. "I asked myself 
whether I could turn my head on wrongdoing, and my answer
was no." (31:1)
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CHAPTER FIVE
CALTRANS PREEXISTING MECHANISMS
Engineers and Contractors Debate over Contract 
Change Orders
Contract change orders (CCOs) arise as an attachment 
to contracts for many reasons. Common causes include a 
change in contract plans, to authorize an increase or 
decrease in contract work, to make adjustments in 
compensation, to change the quantity of an item, to 
compensate for delays to the contractor, or to make a 
change in payment for changes in character of the work. 
Caltrans has a preexisting, elaborate system for preparing 
and using CCOs.
To begin a CCO the engineer must fill out a Form CEM- 
4900 "Contract Change Order" and a Form CEM-4903 "Contract 
Change Order Memorandum" for each change. These forms are
numbered and forwarded to the district office and are
entered into an electronic system for tracking.
Among the preliminary considerations to be made when 
writing a CCO are necessity, impact, time and money. 
Engineers should consult with the contractor when writing
a CCO to discuss all the elements of the change to avoid
conflict later in the construction process.
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The CCO should be clear, concise and explicit. Items
that should be included, if applicable are: what work is
to be done, the location and limits of the work, any 
specification changes and reference to the manual, the 
CCOs affect on the timeline of the job completion, and 
method and amount of compensation for the CCO.
On the description of the work section of the CCO, 
the engineer should be as specific as possible. Often 
times a drawing or a copy of plans will be included with 
the Form 4900 to illustrate the proposed change. All
attachments should show dimensions and calculations to
illustrate the change. Additionally all attached sheets 
should reference the original contract number, the sheet
number and the CCO number.
For adjustments in compensation due to changes in the 
character of the work or requirements of extra work, the 
contractor is required to provide an estimate of the cost, 
through a force account analysis. This will include a 
detailed estimate of the hours for labor and equipment, 
plus materials. Contract specified markups are also
included.
Increases and decreases on contract item are
occasionally required when errors in the contract's 
"Engineers Estimate" is incorrect with respect the
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quantities of items of work. When this occurs the contract 
allows 25% increase or decrease without change to the 
original bid price for the item. If the increase or 
decrease is greater than 25% then an adjustment in the 
price of the item is made based on a force account 
analysis of the work.
Occasionally delays caused by the state to the 
contractor's work schedule occur. Analysis of the original 
schedule submitted by the contractor, compared to the
delay caused by the state, will determine if and how much 
compensation is due to the contractor. The delay must 
impact the controlling items of work. The controlling 
items of work are defined by the "critical path", which is 
a sequential list of work items that must be completed to 
finish the project. Delays caused by the state on items of 
work which are not on the critical path do not delay the 
completion of the project and therefore are not considered 
delays to the project. Issues concerning the actual costs 
of the delay, additional overhead costs, lost opportunity 
costs, costs to subcontractor and suppliers, and so on, 
are often raised by the contractor. The analysis of delays
caused by the state can be complex and the CCOs to handle
the additional compensation are often highly debated.
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The CCO follows a prescribed path throughout the 
organization. At Caltrans there is a CCO desk at the 
district level. New engineer's rotate through this 
assignment for training purposes and review all CCOs on a 
district-wide basis. CCOs of greater dollar or excessive 
time require review, in addition to the district level, by 
the state department of transportation headquarters in
Sacramento. These serve as a second form of review after
the engineers' first review of the CCO.
Dispute Review Boards
To ensure that the claim or contract change order 
disputes are handled in a cost efficient manner the 
organization has established dispute review boards (DRBs). 
The name is appropriate in that the purpose of the DRBs is 
to review disputes between the contractor and Caltrans.
The thought process was that if DRBs were established 
early in the project and kept apprised of the progress of 
the project, they would be there to help as a neutral 
third party when a dispute did arise.
The board is a panel of three experts, one appointed 
by the state and one appointed by the contractor. These
two appointed positions choose the third person for the
panel.
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The goals of the DRBs include; early resolution of 
disputes on the contract administration, minimizing 
surprise disputes at project completion and by their mere 
existence to encourage parties to resolve disputes or face 
DRB process.'
The first goal, focuses resources on dispute 
resolution early in the life of the contract to avoid 
costlier, more litigious and typically less satisfying 
results later on. The fact that the non-binding DRB
recommendation can be introduced in subsequent arbitration 
is a key motivator for both sides to research the dispute 
thoroughly prior to the issue meeting.
The second goal on minimizing surprises is aided by 
the present state specification that requires referral of 
a dispute to the DRB or the Contractor can not pursue the 
issue as an exception (Claim) to the proposed final 
payment or take the matter to arbitration.
Finally the last goal, by their existence, they 
encourage both sides to work together to resolve disputes 
without going through DRB process. This goes to the issues 
of timeliness and cost of further delays.
Additionally, minor issues may not be brought before 
the DRB because of the expense that the contractor or the 
state may incur. Also issues without basis may not be
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brought before the DRB because the party may risk
influencing the DRB negatively on future issues within the 
project completion (16:6).
DRBs began as a pilot project in Los Angeles in the 
year 1990. The original pilot started with six DRBs for 
the Los Angeles construction projects. The DRB is put into 
place when the contract with the state cost involved is 
ten million dollars or more and the engineers estimate 
concludes that they will be working for 200 or more days 
on the project. The success of the pilot project lead the 
way to the "optional" specification on DRBs being included 
in the 1994 version of the Caltran's "Standard Special 
Provisions". Consultant analysis that Caltrans procured in 
1996 lead to the DRBs becoming mandatory on large state 
projects.
By 1998, the DRBs became a mandatory specification on 
qualified construction projects. While the DRBs continued 
to evolve throughout the 1990s the organization learned 
that given the option, the construction contractor would 
only establish a DRB nine percent of the time that one was 
optional. For those cases where a DRB was established, 
they were often started "considerably into the project 
after disputes had arisen" (16:3).
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An analysis of DRB statistics reveal that since the 
ideas inception DRBs have been established on 190 projects 
since 1990 (16:5). In the year 2002, there were 80 DRBs
statewide. These 80 DRBs accounted for over four billion
dollars of construction projects across the state. Further
analysis showed that less than half (43%) of projects with 
an established DRB have had an issue presented to the
board.
The table below shows the results of an analysis of
175 DRB cases where the state received substantially 
complete information (See Figure 1).
Figure 1. Dispute Review Board Recommendations
Source: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 6.
As illustrated the DRBs ruled in the states favor 42%
of the time, the contractor's 52% and for both parties 6%
of the time.
The primary concerns expressed by DRBs were the 
timeliness and communication issues. One example of DRB
concern is the late establishment of a DRB when the
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construction project are well under way or the parties are 
already involved in a dispute. The failure to hold DRB 
status meetings regularly and issue meetings not being 
heard in a timely manner was cause for complaint. Issue 
meetings held near or after contract acceptance and new 
issues being brought out after the acceptance of the 
contract were additionally cited complaints. Communication 
issues revolved around delayed notifications of intent to 
reject the DRB recommendations and information on the DRBs 
formation, status, disputes and completion not being 
appropriately forwarded to all involved parties.
Timeliness is a major issue for DRBs due to the 
statutory timelines imposed by the State Contract Act
Section 10240.2. From the date of contract acceptance, day 
1 through day 240 is detailed in the timeline shown below 
(See Figure 2).
1
PFE Issued
Day 45
r i
Claim Position
Letter Day 135 1
' ▼
Contract PFE
Acceptance Returned
Day Zero Day 75
L J
BOR Meeting 
Day 180
L r
Figure 2, Claims Resolution Timeline Day 1 Through Day 240
Source: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 4.
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The next table illustrates DRB acceptance rates.
These statistics were based on the 175 cases reviewed
where the state received substantially complete
information (See Table 1).
Table 1. Dispute Review Board Recommendation Acceptance 
Rates by Party
□ State 
S Contractor
ArbitrationSource: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 8.
Acceptance rates were higher by the state at 85% on 
the overall statistics and 73% on unfavorable rulings. The
contractors' rates were lower at 74% for overall and 42%
for unfavorable rulings.
Most DRB cases (109 of the 175 reviewed) are
structures (bridge and building construction) related, in 
that they involve the Structures Construction Office.
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Analysis of these oases reveals that the most frequent 
issues are pilings, temporary facilities, welding, 
tiebacks and soil nails. The following chart illustrates 
the frequency percentages from the case analysis (See
Table 2).
Table 2. Frequency of Dispute Review Board Issues
DRB Issues Frequency
Pilings 27%
Temporary
Facilities
9%
Welding 9%
Tiebacks/ Soil 
Nails
7%
Other Items 48%
Source: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 9.
The analysis of the cases showed that 62% of all DRBs
involved structures. These structures cases revealed a
slightly larger percentage (46%) of favorable decisions 
for the state than the statewide percentage (42%) (See 
Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Dispute Review Board. Recommendations on 
Structure Cases
6%
46%
48% □ Contractor's Favor 
estate's Favor
□ Both
Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 3.
Recent DRB Modifications include revisions in the
Standard Special Provisions which adds a retention clause, 
a time frame for issue meetings, clarifications on the 
completion of the DRB process, and details for DRB member 
removal. Additionally, the changes improve the pay scale 
for DRB members. Traditionally the DRB is a three-man 
panel that is assigned to a construction project.
Currently the DRB members are paid $150.00 per hour plus 
expenses as of 2003 wages. Also Construction Procedures
Bulletin (CPB) 02-1 Dispute Review Board Process and 
Responsibilities establishes written policy and procedures 
for DRB administration including handling of
recommendations and provides DRB status forms for the 
Department to evaluate the DRB program effectiveness.
To improve acceptance rates by parties of DRBs 
rulings, planning and training sessions for staff and 
interested parties are available. These include a DRB 
effective presentation course and a dispute training
course.
Board of Review
The Board of Review is a state panel, which provides 
one of the last forms of remedy for construction disputes 
The Board of Review is engaged after the DRB process has
concluded. The Board of Review is made up of state
managing employees.
The table below reveals details of the financial
awards made to the contractors compared to the amounts 
claimed by the contractors. As you can see very little is 
paid at this point. This is because, before a claim gets 
to the Board of Review the issue has usually been 
discussed with management during the project and has the 
management's support in denying payment on the issue.
After the Board of Review decision the contractor can
require the issue go to formal litigation (arbitration). 
Below is a table showing the amount claimed versus the 
amount awarded by the Board of Reviews (See Table 3).
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Table 3. Board of Review Awards
13Dispute Amount 
0BOR Award Amount
Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 3.
Arbitration
Arbitration is the legal process that occurs when the 
State and the contractor can not come to agreement and 
formal litigation is required. This process is very 
expensive to both the state and the contractor and 
typically the cost of the claim increases significantly. 
The state usually limits the cases going to arbitration to 
only those with the best chance of winning decisions for 
the state. However, the pay out on the cases decided 
against the state is usually much higher than the original 
claim presented at the project level. Below is the number
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of oases since 1979 that Caltrans
can see an increase leading up to
is due to a large number of small
bridge seismic retrofit programs.
took to arbitration. You
1999 (See Table 4). This
contracts during the
Table 4. Caltrans Construction Arbitration Filing History- 
Through December
Years
Source: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 5.
Since 1979, there have been 548 Arbitration 
Complaints filed and 482 resolved. This leaves 66
unresolved cases at this time. Since 1994, there have been
304 filings for a value of $458,552,383. Of this amount, 
$99,464,913 has been paid out as awards. And since 1994,
88 cases have had arbitration awards. These 88 cases had
claim amounts of $151,162,849, with arbitration required
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payments of $45,082,259. Also, since 1994, 118 cases have
been settled with a total claim amount of $105,694,544 and 
a total settlement amount of $39,197,604. The graphical 
representation of awards to settlement from 1996 to 2002 
is shown below (See Table 5).
Table 5. Arbitration Results 1996-2002
Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 5.
Below you can see the percent paid compared to the 
claim amount with respect to arbitration awards and
settlements. The average percent paid compared to the 
complaint amount is 42% for those claims settled by
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arbitration award. The percent paid compared to the 
complaint amount averages higher for arbitration awarded 
compensation (See Table 6).
Table 6. Arbitration Results 1996-2002
a Awards H Settlements
Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 10.
The following graph shows the number of arbitration 
cases completed from 1996 to 2002. Additionally, each year
the number of awarded cases versus settled cases is shown
(See Table 7).
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Table 7. Arbitration Results 1996-2002
□Awards □Settlements
Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 11.
Following you can see the number of claims, which 
went to arbitration with respect to the twelve districts 
for the year 2002 (See Table 8).
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Table 8. Current Arbitration Status by District Number of 
Complaints Filed in 2002
H Number of Complaints
Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 13.
The total on going cases in arbitration by district 
(in dollars) is depicted next (See Table 9).
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Table 9. Dollars Claimed by District for 2001
Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 14.
The cumulative unresolved cases from 1979 to 2002 can
also be seen (See Table 10).
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Table 10. Current Unresolved Cases
[EINumber of Cases |
Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 14.
And the cumulative number of active arbitration cases
at each year's end is shown below (See Table 11).
Table 11. Cumulative Active Arbitration Cases
Source-: Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pg. 16.
88
The increase in claims submitted by contractors over 
the years represents changing attitudes of contractors and 
the increasing complexity of construction contracts. The 
bidding process is very competitive and the margin of 
profit is minimal. Therefore, with the increased
complexity of new designs and contract specifications any 
opportunity to claim additional compensation is a regular 
occurrence. Contractors have become much more savvy to
delay claims, overhead claims, lost opportunity claims, 
differing site condition claims, and inefficiency due to 
change in character claims. These claims are legitimate, 
however, often difficult to quantify.
When claims submitted by the contractor cannot be
agreed upon between the state and the contractor,
arbitration is the last resort. Business decisions are
made at this point by both the contractor and the.state 
based on the strength of each side of the issue. The level 
of documentation and the clarity of the contract regarding 
the issue usually determine whether a case will be settled
or taken to the arbitrator. After the decision as to
whether the claim has merit or not is made, then the
determination of the compensation is made. The amount of 
compensation is usually based on a cost analysis, which 
includes time spent for labor and equipment, plus
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materials. Documentation of the day to day work by the 
state and the contractor will agree often. This is true 
for easy to quantify extra work claims, however claims 
involving lost efficiency, delay, overhead cost, etc., are 
much more difficult to quantify. Arbitrators, once the
claim has been determined to have merit, have the
difficult challenge of quantifying the value of the 
compensation. Many times when the contract or 
documentation is weak, it is usually in the best interest 
of the state to settle with the contractor. Usually 
settlements, compared to the original claim amount, have a
lower percentage paid, than arbitrator assessed cost.
The twelve districts in the state have differing
approaches to handling claims. Most have an aggressive 
attitude to handling claims at the project level. Much 
discretionary judgement is given to the project level 
engineers. Other districts are more conservative in making
additional compensation when faced with contractor claims. 
For the most part the engineers at the project level hold 
a firm line with respect to making additional compensation
for contractor claims. Business decisions are not
permitted at the project level. Strict interpretation of 
the contract specifications is the rule of thumb. Decision
regarding weakness or ambiguities in the contract are
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easier to make at the management level. Still business 
decisions to make compensation based on the potential for 
greater cost in arbitration is not made until the claim 
goes past the Board of Review level.
The number of claims that go to arbitration and are 
not awarded compensation leaves the question of how many 
of these claims are falsely submitted. Many of these 
claims can be honest contract disputes, however many could 
be considered fraudulent claims or falsely inflated
claims. Even if a claim is determined to have merit, often 
the claim amount is inflated and an inflated cost analysis 
submitted by the contractor is considered a false claim.
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CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
The California Department of Transportation mission 
statement, in part, states it is responsible for insuring 
the mobility of the public across California. One of the 
values included in the mission statement is stewardship. 
Being good stewards of the states' available resources 
requires getting the most with the available resources. 
This means constantly looking to improve cost savings
tactics.
The funding provided through the State Transportation 
Improvement Program provides the majority of the money for 
highway construction projects. These projects are
contracted out, typically to the lowest bidder. However, 
these contracts are often extremely complex, with hundreds 
of pages for plans, standard specifications and special 
provisions on each contract. This leads to opportunity for 
a large numbers of contract disputes. With the contracts 
being awarded to the lowest bidder, the margin for profit 
by these contractors is minimal. Contractors have become 
skilled in the art of seeking additional compensation 
after the contract is awarded. Contract issues regarding 
changes to the original planned work, lost opportunity and
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overhead cost associated with delays in the work, and 
inefficiencies and extra work due to changes is
characteristic of the work and often causes contract
disputes. Notices of potential claims are submitted to the 
state for each of these contract disputes. Analysis of the 
associated cost itself has become big business. Many 
consultant firms focus on providing assistance to the 
contractor in evaluating the cost associated with time 
related overhead claims, construction progress schedule
delay claims and differing site condition claims. Project 
engineers, contractors and experts struggle to handle and 
settle these claims for additional compensation at the
project level.
Elaborate systems are in place to handle changes and 
requests for additional compensation that arise during the 
construction project. Many checks and balances are built 
into the system. Often larger projects will have
individual Dispute Review Boards (DRB) built into the 
contract. However, the DRB usually only determines whether
a claim has merit or not, and does not consider the amount
of the cost associated with the claim. The potential
exists for false cost submittals when the DRB has
determined merit is found. DRB rule in the states' favor
42% of the time, and in the contractors' favor 52% of the
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time. The state and the contractor can reject the DRB's 
decision, however the ruling is included in the reports 
for further consideration by Board of Reviews and 
Arbitration. Acceptance of the DRBs' decision is 85% by
the state overall and 73% for unfavorable decisions.
Contractors' acceptance of DRBs' decision is 74% overall
and 42% for unfavorable decisions to the contractor. A
project with or without a DRB will probably still have 
unresolved claims at the end of the project. These claims
are then sent to the Caltrans' Boards of Review. However,
few claims are settled at this point and most go to the 
legal department and arbitration. This is true because the 
Caltrans' Boards of Review are made up of Caltrans' 
Managers and these individuals are usually consulted 
during the project level discussion and consideration of 
the claims. Usually the costs associated with these claims 
escalate from the project level to arbitration. The 
percent paid, at arbitration, of claims submitted varies 
from year to year. The amount paid also varies and is in 
part a function of the settlements made prior to
arbitration decisions. The further the claim gets from the 
project level, the wider the dispute becomes. This leads
to another potential for increased submissions of false
claims.
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The False Claims Act (FCA) originally conceived by 
England in the 13th century, and first initiated in the 
United States by President Lincoln during the Civil War, 
allows private individuals to sue on behalf of the 
government for the submission and payment of false claims 
for compensation from the government. These "qui tam" 
provisions of the FCA allow "whistle blowers" to be paid a 
percentage of the fines imposed on the guilty party.
The current-day version of the FCA law, proposed by 
President Reagan, empowers ordinary citizens to act as 
private attorneys generally by filing qui tam
whistleblower suits against those who defraud the
government. Prompted by widely publicized cases of fraud 
against the military in their procurement of supplies, the
new amended law allow citizens to receive 30% of the
action or 15% if the government agency participates. The 
guilty party in a qui tam case, may pay fines between five
and ten thousand dollars for each act and as much as three
times the damages to the government. In the federal arena 
the Attorney General is required to investigate violations 
of the law. Since the passage of the amended FCA in 1986, 
more than 3,000 qui tam cases have been filed.
In order to prove guilt under the FCA the party must 
have "knowingly" contributed, that is have actual
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knowledge of the information and deliberately ignores the 
truth. A claim under the FCA can be any demand for money 
or property. The person alleging the false claim must 
bring suit in both their names and the governments' name.
The government has 60 days to decide if it will join 
in the action under the FCA. The individual bringing the 
action, if successful, is entitled to reimbursement of all 
legal fees and court costs in addition to the judgement. 
Government officials are not allowed to bring an action to
court.
The legislation seeks to protect the person bringing 
the action, hence the "whistle blower" law. This 
protection can extend to their employment. Any person who 
is fired, suspended or harassed in any way due to a FCA 
can seek relief under the legislation. This can include 
being reinstated at work or whatever it takes to make the 
employee feel whole again.
This paper reviews the legislation and court rulings
to determine their relevance for Caltrans. Caltrans must
defend the public dollars during the construction process. 
Included is the California False Claims legislation since
Caltrans is a branch of California government.
The case law for the FCA is extensive. The courts
have addressed the constitutionality of the FCA, and
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whether are not a qui tam plaintiff has standing under
Article III of the Constitution (consistent with the
principles of the separation of the powers provisions).
The possible violation of the due process clause has been 
addressed, along with defining whether a state could be 
considered a "person" in a FCA action. Additionally, the 
"public disclosure bar" included in the FCA legislation
has been addressed in the case law, along with the
"original source" and the "government intervention" 
requirements of the FCA law.
Based on the Constitutional separation of powers 
"Congress is powerless to distribute powers that it does 
not have". This holding was from a Texas District Court, 
in U.S. ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co. 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 
1993). The court also claimed Congress is not given the 
power to prosecute fraud cases. The court stated that 
standing was an integral part of our separation of powers 
and Congress should not be allowed to circumvent the 
Article III standing requirements. However, this ruling 
was contradictory to years of case law and another Texas
court in the same district and later the same year, 
disagreed with the unconstitutionality of the qui tam
provision of the False Claims Act. In U. S. ex rel.
Thompson v. Columbia / HCA Healthcare Corp, et al., Order,
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Civil Action No. C-95-110 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 1998), this
Texas District Court noted that where the government has 
suffered an injury-in-fact, the relator merely steps in as 
its representative or assignee to carry out the statute's 
purpose of remedying fraud against the government. 
Moreover, the FCA provides sufficient control of the qui
tam suit and the relator has a personal stake in the
outcome of his suit. This court also observed that none,
including the Supreme Court has ruled the relator lack 
standing in FCA litigation.
With respect to due process, in U.S. ex rel. Fallon et al.
v. Accudyne Corp, and Alliant Techsystems, Inc., the
defendants cited a case, which held that private attorneys 
appointed, must be personally disinterested in criminal 
prosecution. Therefore, the defendants claimed that the 
due process clause is violated by permitting private 
citizens with an interest in the outcome of the proceeding 
to prosecute claims on behalf of the United States. The 
court rejected the argument stating the case cited was a 
criminal case and not a civil case and appointing a 
relator (or prosecutor) with an interest in the litigation 
does not rise to a due process violation.
The Supreme Court decided in split decision that: "a 
state or state agency is not a "person" subject to qui tam
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liability under § 3729 of the False Claims Act." (39:4) 
The Court, looking at a longstanding resumption that the 
term person does not include the sovereign, the Court 
found no affirmative showing of congressional intent to 
the contrary in the FCA. According to the Court, the FCA 
as originally enacted in 1863 "bore no indication that 
States were subject to its penalties" and none of the 
subsequent amendments to the statute, including the 1986 
amendments, suggested a broadening of the term person 
(39:5). The Court applied the ordinary rule of statutory
construction known as the clear statement rule, which
holds that "if Congress intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between States and the Federal
Government, it must make its intention to do so
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." While 
the Supreme Court concluded that an individual in a qui
tam action cannot sue a state, the Court did not decide
whether or not a suit could be brought by the United
States against a state. Justice Ginsburg stated,
"the clear statement rule applied to private 
suits against a State has not been applied when 
the United States is the plaintiff." therefore 
"I read the Court's decision to leave open the 
question whether the word 'person' encompasses 
States when the United States itself sues under 
the False Claims Act." (39:5)
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Also unresolved, by the Supreme Court is whether or not 
municipalities, municipal agencies, counties and other 
local government entities can be considered "persons" and 
liable under the False Claims Act. Additionally, no
resolution was made whether a State or local "proprietary"
or "independent" entity can be sued and whether or not 
State or other government employees can be sued as 
"persons" under the False Claims Act.
The original source and public disclosure bar
provisions in the FCA have been addressed in U.S. ex rel.
Grayson et al. v. Advanced Management Technology et al. 
Section 3730 of the False Claims Act requires the relator 
to be the original source of false claim information in a 
qui tam suit, and the information can not be disclosed 
publicly previous to the suit. In this case the false
claim information was derived from an administrative
complaint previously filed with the FAA by an unsuccessful 
bidder of the government contract. The court also held the 
relator "Grayson and Hoffman", who were acting as
attorneys for the Camber Corporation were not the original 
source and the information provided by others was 
insufficient as "direct" and "independent" knowledge as 
required by the statute. (41:1) Also with respect to the 
public disclosure and direct knowledge provisions, in U.S.
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ex rel. Hansen v. Cargill, Inc. et al., a California
district court ruled the relator did not have "direct
knowledge" and did not meet the original source
requirements of the False Claims Act, because the
information presented had been publicly disclosed by the 
news media. The court made this ruling while acknowledging
the relator had been the source of the disclosure to the
media. (41:2) In U. S. ex rel. Coleman v. State of Indiana
et al., an Indiana district court decided that the public
disclosure bar of the False Claims Act included state
administrative proceedings and hearings. The court
dismissed the case stating his was not the original 
source, since the Indiana General Assembly, Administrative 
Rules Oversight Committee met and discussed a similar 
compliant previous to Coleman suit. And in U.S. ex rel.
Downy v. Corning, Inc. et al., a New Mexico district court
ruled in favor of the relator and a general public
discussion did not meet the public disclosure bar. The 
court concluded that the intent was to prohibit qui tam 
actions only when either the allegations of fraud or the
critical elements of the fraudulent transaction themselves
are public.
Government intervention provisions of the FCA are
studied in U.S. ex rel. Newsham and Bloem v. Lockheed
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Missiles and Space Company, Inc. The 11th Circuit Court 
stated "once a qui tam suit is filed, the Government has 
sixty days to choose one of only two options: to intervene 
and proceed with the action, or to decline intervention.
In this case the court found "The government has from the 
beginning flagrantly and repeatedly violated the 
provisions of the statute." The 11th Circuit also "held 
that the FCA does not contain a general prohibition 
against government employees filing qui tam suits..."
(21:13). The court ruled that the Government's settlement
with NEC was an "intervention" in the lawsuit within the
meaning of the FCA. Further, the settlement effectively 
terminated the lawsuit, except for the determination of 
Williams' statutory compensation of between 15 and 25 
percent (as well as attorneys' fees and expenses). The 
court ruled that Williams was entitled to 15 percent of
the $34 million settlement.
Relevant FCA cases studied in the construction
industry include the City of Pomona v. Superior Court, 89
Cal. App. 4th 793 (2001), Stacy & Witbeck, Inc. v. City
and County of San Francisco, Cal. App. 4th 1, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 530 (1996), United States versus Azzarelli
Construction Company in 1981, United States ex rel. Ashol
Bhatnagar v. Kiewit Pacific Co., State of California,
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Department of Transportation, U.S. ex rel. Shaw v. AAA
Engineering & Drafting, Inc. et al., and cases with the 
Los Angeles Metropolitan Authority versus its' contractors 
Tutor-Saliba Corporation and Shea-Kiewit-Kenny.
In the City of Pomona case, we learned a supplier was
held accountable for out of specification materials used 
on a city project. Although the supplier had no 
contractual connection with the government, the California 
FCA was used to litigate. The city contractor purchased 
and installed pipe from a catalog, stating the pipe met 
the specified corrosion requirements. However, the 
supplier had changed the pipe construction without 
changing the catalog. The supplier was found to be liable 
under the FCA and required to pay damages even though the 
supplier had no contract with the city and had made no 
direct claim for payment with the city.
In Stacy & Witbeck, Inc. v. City and County of San
Francisco, the contractor stated the documentation
provided to the city during the contractual claims process 
was inadmissible in the FCA case filed by the government. 
Stacy and Witbeck asserted the claims were submitted in 
anticipation of litigation and therefore privileged. The 
court disagreed, stating the submission was a contractual 
requirement and the contractor had no immunity for False
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Claim liability, for statements and claims made in the 
course of the contractual claims submission process.
In the case of the United States versus Azzarelli
Construction Company in 1981 the defendants allegedly 
rigged a bid on a state highway project. However, the 
court ruled even if the alleged rigging of the bid was 
true, the federal government had not paid additional money 
as a result. The money paid by the federal government to 
states for highway construction was fixed and was 
unchanged by the bidding. Therefore, the federal 
government had not been damaged and the case was
dismissed.
In the case United States ex rel. Ashol Bhatnagar v.
Kiewit Pacific Co., State of California, Department of
Transportation, a U.S. District Court for Northern
California dismissed the case. Bhatnagar brought the FCA 
action against Kiewit Pacific stating Kiewit Pacific 
claimed additional compensation to provide storm water 
control. The contract included storm water protection as 
part of the original bid price, however the requirements 
for storm water protection were changed by the California 
Regional Water Quality Board after the bid was awarded.
The judge dismissed the action stating this was a contract 
dispute issue.
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Bhatnagar also brought action against the State of 
California, Department of Transportation (Caltrans), for 
retaliation against Bhatnagar and for submitting request 
for federal reimbursement under an approved traffic 
control change order. The judge also dismissed the action 
against Caltrans, stating the state was not liable under 
the FCA since the state was not considered a "person".
In U.S. ex rel. Shaw v. AAA Engineering & Drafting,
Inc. et al., the contractor was paid full payment for an
item of work which included disposal of materials per the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) . The contractor 
stated the government knew the disposal was not being 
performed per the EPA requirements and the fixed bid price 
for the work and there was no misrepresentation. The court 
disagreed and found AAA liable under the FCA. The court 
asserted that by the monthly billing, AAA has expressed or 
implied compliance with the contract and the EPA 
requirement.
In the cases with the Los Angeles Metropolitan
Transit Authority (MTA) versus its' contractors Tutor-
Saliba Corporation and Shea-Kiewit-Kenny (SKK), the court 
found the contractors liable under the FCA despite 
ambiguities and omissions in the contract plans and 
specifications. SKK had left out of the original bid price
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what he thought was work that had been omitted or unclear 
on the contract plans. After the contract was awarded many 
subsequent requests for change orders and additional 
compensation were made that increased the project costs by 
more than $179 million (25:2). Additionally, MTA accused
SKK of using substandard materials. In the Tutor-Saliba
Corporation case the judge stated the contractor was 
liable for unfair business practices, including false 
claims and improper listing of contractors (31:1). The 
judge ruled in favor of the MTA for approximately 31.4
million dollars (34:3).
Conclusion
The implications for the California Department of 
Transportation (Caltrans) can be studied in the individual 
cases. The federal and state FCAs are proving to be 
effective tools against fraud in government contracts.
Awards in the millions and billions of dollars have been
issued as a result of FCA litigation. The acts have 
sustained Supreme Court and lower courts scrutiny. Aspects 
of the FCA laws have been well defined by recent court 
ruling. FCA litigation can be brought by the government 
agencies involved or by private individual. The qui tam 
provisions of the act allow whistleblowers whom are the
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original source of the false claim to receive a
substantial percentage of the fines and penalties in a 
successful litigation. In the case of United States ex
rel. Ashol Bhatnagar v. Kiewit Pacific Co., State of
California, Department of Transportation, the contract 
between Kiewit and Caltrans clearly required Kiewit to 
adhere to the California law regarding storm water 
protection. However, the increased enforcement of the law 
by Caltrans, a result of pressure from the California 
Regional Water Quality Board, cost the contractor more 
than his bid reflected. Even though the contract required 
storm water protection included in the bid, the contractor
based his bid on the historic enforcement of the
requirement. Mr. Bhatnagar contended in his FCA action 
that claiming the cost for meeting the requirements of the 
California Regional Water Quality Board and Caltrans 
amounted to a false claim, because the language of the 
contract specified meeting the storm water protection 
requirements as part of the contract. Despite.the fact the 
contract required this work and the contractor filed a 
claim for addition compensation, the court decided this 
was a contract dispute issue and not a false claim. It is 
not uncommon for additional compensation to be claimed, 
even when the contract is clear on the required work, when
107
historically the enforcement of the required work has been
less. A contract for a construction project will typically
have four main documents as part of the contract. These 
include the plans, standard specifications, standard 
plans, and special provisions for the project. In 
addition, the standard specifications will include and
refer to Federal and State laws, which thereby become part
of the contract as well. These additional documents and
laws are numerous and the rules and enforcement of the
laws change due to legal rulings, policy changes, etc. As 
we learn from the Bhatnagar versus Kiewit case provisions 
clearly stated in the contract can be legitimately claimed 
and considered a contract dispute and not a false claim. 
Basing the bid price on the historical enforcement of the 
contract language, then claiming additional cost when 
enforcement and policies change is economically sound for 
the state, since this keeps the bidding prices low until a 
particular issue comes to light and increased work is
demanded.
With respect to the Bhatnagar versus Kiewit case we
also learned the state and its' agencies are not liable 
for retaliation under the FCA. Additionally, the state and 
its' agencies are not liable in federal litigation under 
the FCA. The fact that the storm water protection claim
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and payment was submitted for federal reimbursement under 
the traffic control change order of the contract did not
negate the states' immunity to the FCA.
In a similar case can be made where the contract
required adherence to the EPA law, the court found the
contractor liable under the FCA for not meeting the
requirement. According to U.S. ex rel. Shaw v. AAA 
Engineering & Drafting, inc. et al., the contractor was 
paid full payment for the item of work contracted which 
included disposal of materials. The contractor stated the 
government knew he was not meeting the EPA law, however
paid him for the work. The implication for Caltrans is
that private individuals can sue government contractors 
for noncompliance of numerous state and federal 
regulations, when full payment is made for the item work 
associated with the government regulations.
A publicly disclosed noncompliance or false claim
cannot be litigated under the FCA. In U.S. ex rel. Hansen
v. Cargill, Inc. et al., the FCA relator Hansen filed 
litigation after the media had released the information 
supporting the action. The court ruled the defendant was 
not liable under the FCA due to the public disclosure bar 
provision of the act, despite the fact Hansen was the
source to the media release. And in U.S. ex rel. Coleman
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v. State of Indiana et al., we learn the public disclosure
bar includes administrative hearing. This is not the case 
however, where fraud or fraudulent transactions themselves
are not discussed as in U.S. ex rel. Downy v. Corning,
Inc. et al.
The implications for Caltrans of the FCA ruling in
U.S. ex rel. Newsham and Bloem v. Lockheed Missiles and
Space Company, Inc. are both government employees can
bring FCA action and the government agency cannot settle 
the litigation out of court independent of the relator.
The settlement by the government in this case effectively 
terminated the lawsuit, except for the determination of 
Williams' statutory compensation of between 15 and 25 
percent (as well as attorneys' fees and expenses). The 
court ruled that Williams was entitled to 15 percent of
the $34 million settlement.
With respect to the City of Pomona v. Superior Court 
case we learn a significant implication regarding 
subcontractor, and suppliers not directly contracted with 
Caltrans. In this case, the supplier for the contractor
provided materials which did not meet the specifications 
of the contract, yet implied to the contractor, in 
catalogs, the materials did meet the specifications. Even 
though there was no contract with the supplier, the City
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of Pomona was able to use the California FCA to sue the
supplier. Caltrans' projects will have one contract with 
the prime contractor. The prime contractor will have 
numerous subcontractors and suppliers. These 
subcontractors and suppliers have no contract with the 
state, however will routinely submit claims for additional 
compensation from the state through the prime contractor. 
The FCA is proven in the City of Pomona case to be a 
viable course to address fraud by companies with no
contractual obligation to the government agency.
In Stacy & Witbeck, Inc. v. City and County of San
Francisco, the implication for Caltrans is that the 
contractual requirement for "notice of potential claims"
documentation can be used in later FCA action. The
Standard Specifications requires a notice of potential 
claim be submitted within 15 days of the contractor 
learning of an issue that might yield a claim. This notice 
of potential claim starts a process of project level 
discussion regarding the issue and sometimes leads to 
contract change order (payment), dispute review board 
hearings, or negotiations of the issue. Documentation of 
costs are required for the notice of potential claim. In 
the Stacy and Witbeck case the defendant argued the 
documentation submitted was privileged since further
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arbitration was anticipated. The court decided however,
these documents were admissible in FCA actions. Even
though a fraudulent notice of potential claim probably can
not be considered a FCA violation, the documentation 
submitted in the notice of potential claim process can be
used if a formal claim is later submitted.
And finally with respect to Caltrans we learn in the 
MTA case against Tutor-Saliba Corporation and Shea-Kiewit- 
Kenny failure on the part of the contractor to submit pre­
bid documents during claims discussions are FCA
violations. Additionally, many requirements regarding 
bidding practices, submitting of extra work bills and 
contractual requirements for listing subcontractor can be 
used in FCA litigation. Caltrans routinely experiences 
claims for additional compensation for ambiguities and 
omissions in the plans and specifications left out of the 
original bid. Called "low ball" bidding where omissions 
from the bid are made then later requested in additional 
compensation through contract change orders or claims, 
these practices are unfair. Pre-bid calculations are 
required during claims negotiations and failure to submit
this documentation is a violation of the FCA.
The Caltrans processes and procedures for handling 
contract change orders, notice of potential claims,
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claims, settlements and arbitrations are comprehensive. It 
is difficult to say of the many claims submitted, how many 
are fraudulent. Most claims are legitimate contract 
disputes. The contract specifications require notice of 
potential claims so discussion can be started at the 
project level. Many of these notices of potential claims 
result in contract change orders where additional
compensation is made. Approvals of these change orders 
require several levels of concurrence.
Any additional compensation that has any doubt in 
appropriateness would not be approved and required to go 
to a Dispute Review Board (DRB). At the Dispute Review 
Board level these claims for the majority are considered 
to have merit and usually additional compensation is made. 
For the most part, a ruling by the DRB is accepted by both 
parties, however not always.
The Caltrans Board of Review decides again if the 
claim is unsettled and before it goes to Caltrans legal 
department for settlement or arbitration. Contractor 
claims for additional compensation which go to arbitration 
are the cases Caltrans feels most likely the state will 
win. Otherwise the claim is typically settled. In order 
for a fraudulent claim to be paid, theoretically, it would 
have to pass the arbitration process. This is not likely,
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because a fraudulent claim is by definition not simply a 
contract dispute and is easily seen by the arbitrator as
false in nature.
Recommendations
This paper recommends that the federal and state FCAs
might not be a good tool against false or fraudulent
Caltrans construction claims. Many of the state
contractors are repeat bidders. Most claims submitted by 
these contractors are honest contract disputes. It is 
possible that contractors, subcontractors and suppliers 
submit claims, which might be considered false. However, 
the Caltrans system for handling claims, from the initial 
notice of potential claim, to the DRB, Board of Review and 
arbitration, effectively weeds out the inappropriate 
claims. The FCA could be used as a punitive tool for 
contractors submitting false claims, however the long term 
result might be more costly than a benefit. The FCA action 
can be brought by private citizens as well as government 
agencies. If the legitimate state contractors were forced 
to face numerous FCA litigation, the result would be 
reflected in higher project bid prices and possibly lower 
the number of bidders. Actions brought by private citizens 
would undermine the- governmental agencies authority and 
big picture concerns for the best public interest. Actions
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brought by the government agency might encourage more 
private actions brought and thus opening a Pandora's box. 
The upside of punishing the dishonest contractors would be 
outweighed by the additional cost incurred by the honest 
state contractors subjected to FCA litigation. The 
exception to the rule is the possible FCA litigation of 
subcontractor and suppliers when there is no direct 
contract with the subcontractor or supplier, as in the 
City of Pomona versus Superior Court case. However, even 
in the case of subcontractors and suppliers, the potential
down side of increased FCA cases to all contractors
suggest other recourse should be sought.
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-CITE—
31 USC Sec. 3729
-EXPCITE-
TITLE 31 - MONEY AND FINANCE
SUBTITLE III - FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
CHAPTER 37 - CLAIMS
SUBCHAPTER III - CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
-HEAD-
Sec. 3729. False claims
-STATUTE-
а) Liability for Certain Acts. - Any person who -
1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or 
employee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed 
Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment 
or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a 
false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or 
approved by the Government;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or 
fraudulent claim allowed or paid;
(4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or 
to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the 
Government or willfully to conceal the property, delivers, or causes 
to be delivered, less property than the amount for which
the person receives a certificate or receipt;
5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of 
property used, or to be used, by the government and, intending to 
defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without 
completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;
б) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, 
public property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a 
member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge the 
property; or
7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a
false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government, is liable to the United States Government for a civil 
penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 
times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of 
the act of that person, except that if the court finds that -
(A) the person committing the violation of this 
subsection furnished officials of the United States responsible for 
investigating false claims violations with all information known to 
such person about the violation within 30 days after the date on 
which the defendant first obtained the information;
(B) such person fully cooperated with any Government investigation of 
such violation; and
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(C) at the time such person furnished the United States with the 
information about the violation, no criminal prosecution, civil 
action, or administrative action had commenced under this title with 
respect to such violation, and the person did not have actual 
knowledge of the existence of an investigation into such violation; 
the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages 
which the Government sustains because of the act of the person. A 
person violating this subsection shall also be liable to the United 
States Government for the costs of a civil action brought to recover 
any such penalty or damages.
(b) Knowing and Knowingly Defined. - For purposes of this 
section, the terms ’’knowing'1 and 1’knowingly'' mean that a 
person, with respect to information -
(1) has actual knowledge of the information;
(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the 
information; or
(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the 
information, and no proof of specific intent to defraud is 
required.
(c) Claim Defined. - For purposes of this section, ’'claim' ' includes 
any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for 
money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or 
other recipient if the United States Government provides any 
portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded, 
or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or 
other recipient for any portion of the money or property which 
is requested or demanded.
(d) Exemption From Disclosure. - Any information furnished pursuant 
to subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (a) shall be 
exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5.
(e) Exclusion. - This section does not apply to claims, records, or 
statements made under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
-SOURCE-
(Pub. L. 97-258, Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 978; Pub. L. 99-562,
Sec.
2, Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3153; Pub. L. 103-272, Sec.
4(f)(1)(O),
July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1362.)
-MISC1-
Historical and Revision Notes
Revised Section 
Large)
Source (U.S. Code) Source (Statutes at
3729 31:231. R.S. Sec. 3490.
In the section, before clause (1), the words ''a member of an 
armed force of the United States'' are substituted for ''in the 
military or naval forces of the United States, or in the militia 
called into or actually employed in the service of the United
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States’' and ’'military or naval service'' for consistency with 
title 10. The words ’’is liable'' are substituted for ''shall forfeit 
and pay'' for consistency. The words ''civil action'' are
substituted for ''suit'' for consistency in the revised title and 
with other titles of the United States Code. The words ''and such 
forfeiture and damages shall be sued for in the same suit'' are 
omitted as unnecessary because of rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (28 App. U.S.C.). In clauses (l)-(3), the words 
''false or fraudulent'1 are substituted for ''false, fictitious, or 
fraudulent'' and ''Fraudulent or fictitious'' to eliminate 
unnecessary words and for consistency. In clause (1), the words 
''presents, or causes to be presented'' are substituted for ''shall 
make or cause to be made, or present or cause to be presented'' for 
clarity and consistency and to eliminate unnecessary words. The 
words ''officer or employee of the Government or a member of an armed 
force'' are substituted for ''officer in the civil, military, or 
naval service of the United States'' for consistency in the revised 
title and with other titles of the Code. The words ''upon or against 
the Government of the United States, or any department of the United 
States, or any department or officer thereof'' are omitted as 
surplus. In clause (2), the word ''knowingly'' is substituted for 
''knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement 
or entry'' to eliminate unnecessary words. The words ''record or 
statement’’ are substituted for ''bill, receipt, voucher, roll, 
account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition'' for 
consistency in the revised title and with other titles of the Code.
In clause (3), the words ''conspires to1' are substituted for 
''enters into any agreement, combination, or conspiracy'' to 
eliminate unnecessary words. The words "of the United States, or 
any department or officer thereof'' are omitted as surplus. In 
clause (4), the words ''charge'', ’’or other'', and ''to any other 
person having authority to receive the same'' are omitted as surplus.
In clause (5), the words ''document certifying receipt1' are 
substituted for 11 certificate, voucher, receipt, or other paper 
certifying the receipt'' to eliminate unnecessary words. The words 
''arms, ammunition, provisions, clothing, or other'', ''to any other 
person'', and ''the truth of'1 are omitted as surplus. In clause 
(6), the words ''arms, equipments, ammunition, clothes, military 
stores, or other'' are omitted as surplus. The words ''member of an 
armed force'' are substituted for ''soldier, officer, sailor, or 
other person called into or employed in the military or naval 
service'' for consistency with title 10. The words ''such soldier, 
sailor, officer, or other person'' are omitted as surplus.
-REFTEXT-
REFERENCES IN TEXT
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (e), 
is
classified generally to Title 26, Internal Revenue Code.
-MISC2-
AMENDMENTS
1994 - Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 103-272 substituted ''1986'' for 
''1954''.
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1986 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 99-562, Sec. 2(1), designated 
existing provisions as subsec. (a), inserted subsec. heading, and 
substituted ''Any person who'' for ’'A person not a member of an 
armed force of the United States is liable to the United States 
Government for a civil penalty of $2,000, an amount equal to 2 
times the amount of damages the Government sustains because of the 
act of that person, and costs of the civil action, if the person'' 
in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 99-562, Sec. 2(2), substituted ''United 
States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United
States'' for ''Government or a member of an armed force''.
Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 99-562, Sec. 2(3), inserted ''by the
Government'' after ''approved''.
Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 99-562, Sec. 2(4), substituted
''control of property'' for ''control of public property'' and ''by 
the Government'' for ''in an armed force''.
Subsec. (a) (5) . Pub . L. 99-562, Sec. 2(5) , substituted ' 'by themT-nont* t 1 for ' 'in an armedl force' ' and ''true;; ' ' for ' ' true;
OJ_
Subsec. (a) (6) . Pub . L. 99-562, Sec. 2(6), substituted ' 1 an
officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed 
Forces,'' for ''a member of an armed force'' and ''property; or" 
for ''property.''
Subsec. (a)(7). Pub. L. 99-562, Sec. 2(7), added par. (7). 
Subsecs, (b) to (e). Pub. L. 99-562, Sec. 2(7), added subsecs.
(b) to (e) .
INCREASED PENALTIES FOR FALSE CLAIMS IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
Pub. L. 99-145, title IX, Sec. 931(b), Nov. 8, 1985, 99 Stat. 
699, provided that: ''Notwithstanding section 3729 of title 31, 
United States Code, the amount of the liability under that section 
in the case of a person who makes a false claim related to a 
contract with the Department of Defense shall be a civil penalty of 
$2,000, an amount equal to three times the amount of the damages 
the Government sustains because of the act of the person, and costs 
of the civil action.''
(Section 931(c) of Pub. L. 99-145 provided that section 931(b) 
is
applicable to claims made or presented on or after Nov. 8, 1985.) 
-SECREF-
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in sections 3730, 3731, 3732, 3733 
of this title; title 10 section 2324; title 15 section 657a; title 20 
section 1078-9; title 41 section 256; title 42 section 1395i.
122
APPENDIX C
CALIFORNIA FALSE CLAIMS ACT
123
CALIFORNIA FALSE CLAIMS ACT
CALIFORNIA CODES
GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 12650-12655
12650.
(a) This article shall be known and may be cited as the 
False Claims Act.
(b) For purposes of this article:
(1) "Claim" includes any request or demand for money, property, or 
services made to any employee, officer, or agent of the state or of 
any political subdivision, or to any contractor, grantee, or other 
recipient, whether under contract or not, if any portion of the 
money, property, or services requested or demanded issued from, or 
was provided by, the state (hereinafter "state funds") or by any 
political subdivision thereof (hereinafter "political subdivision 
funds").
(2) "Knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person, with respect to 
information, does any of the following:
(A) Has actual knowledge of the information.
(B) Acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the 
information.
(C) Acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the 
information. Proof of specific intent to defraud is not required.
(3) "Political subdivision" includes any city, city and county, 
county, tax or assessment district, or other legally authorized local 
governmental entity with jurisdictional boundaries.
(4) "Prosecuting authority" refers to the county counsel, city 
attorney, or other local government official charged with 
investigating, filing, and conducting civil legal proceedings on 
behalf of, or in the name of, a particular political subdivision.
(5) "Person" includes any natural person, corporation, firm, 
association, organization, partnership, limited liability company, 
business, or trust.
12651.
(a) Any person who commits any of the following acts shall 
be liable to the state or to the political subdivision for three 
times the amount of damages which the state or the political 
subdivision sustains because of the act of that person. A person who 
commits any of the following acts shall also be liable to the state 
or to the political subdivision for the costs of a civil 
actionbrought to recover any of those penalties or damages, and may 
be
liable to the state or political sudivision for a civil penalty of up 
to ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each false claim:
(1) Knowingly presents or causes to be presented to an officer or 
employee of the state or of any political subdivision thereof, afalse 
claim for payment or approval.
(2) Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used a false 
record or statement to get a false claim paid or approved by the 
state or by any political subdivision.
(3) Conspires to defraud the state or any political subdivision by 
getting a false claim allowed or paid by the state or by any 
political subdivision.
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(4) Has possession, custody, or control of public property or money 
used or to be used by the state or by any political subdivision and 
knowingly delivers or causes to be delivered less property than the 
amount for which the person receives a certificate or receipt.
(5) Is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of 
property used or to be used by the state or by any political 
subdivision and knowingly makes or delivers a receipt that falsely 
represents the property used or to be used.
(6) Knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, 
public property from any person who lawfully may not sell or pledge 
the property.
(7) Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used a false
record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to 
pay or transmit money or property to the state or to any political 
subdivision. ,
(8) Is a beneficiary of an inadvertent submission of a false claim to 
the state or a political subdivision, subsequently discovers the 
falsity of the claim, and fails to disclose the false claim to the 
state or the political subdivision within a reasonable time after 
discovery of the false claim.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the court may assess not less 
than two times and not more than three times the amount of damages 
which the state or the political subdivision sustains because of the 
act of the person described in that subdivision, and no civil 
penalty, if the court finds all of the following:
(1) The person committing the violation furnished officials of the 
state or of the political subdivision responsible for investigating 
false claims violations with all information known to that person 
about the violation within 30 days after the date on which the 
personfirst obtained the information.
(2) The person fully cooperated with any investigation by the state 
or a political subdivision of the violation.
(3) At the time the person furnished the state or the political 
subdivision with information about the violation, no criminal 
prosecution, civil action, or administrative action had commenced 
with respect to the violation, and the person did not have actual 
knowledge of the existence of an investigation into the violation.
(c) Liability under this section shall be joint and several for any 
act committed by two or more persons.
(d) This section does not apply to any controversy involving an 
amount of less than five hundred dollars ($500) in value. For 
purposes of this subdivision, "controversy" means any one or more 
false claims submitted by the same person in violation of this 
article.
(e) This section does not apply to claims, records, or statements 
made pursuant to Division 3.6 (commencing with Section 810) of Title 
1 or to workers' compensation claims filed pursuant to Division 4 
(commencing with Section 3200) of the Labor Code.
(f) This section does not apply to claims, records, or statements 
made under the Revenue and Taxation Code.
12652.
(a) (1) The Attorney General shall diligently investigate
violations under Section 12651 involving state funds. If the 
Attorney General finds that a person has violated or is violating 
Section 12651, the Attorney General may bring a civil action under 
this section against that person.
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(2) If the Attorney General brings a civil action under this 
subdivision on a claim involving political subdivision funds as well 
as state funds, the Attorney General shall, on the same date that the 
complaint is filed in this action, serve by mail with "return receipt 
requested" a copy of the complaint on the appropriate prosecuting 
authority.
(3) The prosecuting authority shall have the right to intervene in an 
action brought by the Attorney General under this subdivision within 
60 days after receipt of the complaint pursuant to paragraph(2). The 
court may permit intervention thereafter upon a showingthat all of 
the requirements of Section 387 of the Code of Civil
Procedure have been met.
(b) (1) The prosecuting authority of a political subdivision shall 
diligently investigate violations under Section 12651 involving 
political subdivision funds. If the prosecuting authority finds that 
a person has violated or is violating Section 12651, the prosecuting 
authority may bring a civil action under this section against that 
person.
(2) If the prosecuting authority brings a civil action under this 
section on a claim involving state funds as well as political 
subdivision funds, the prosecuting authority shall, on the same date 
that the complaint is filed in this action, serve a copy of 
thecomplaint on the Attorney General.
(3) Within 60 days after receiving the complaint pursuant to 
paragraph (2), the Attorney General shall do either of the following:
(A) Notify the court that it intends to proceed with the action, in 
which case the Attorney General shall assume primary 
responsibility for conducting the action and the prosecuting 
authority shall have the right to continue as a party.
(B) Notify the court that it declines to proceed with the action, in 
which case the prosecuting authority shall have the right to conduct 
the action.
(c) (1) A person may bring a civil action for a violation of this 
article for the person and either for the State of California in the 
name of the state, if any state funds are involved, or for a 
political subdivision in the name of the political subdivision, if 
political subdivision funds are exclusively involved. The person 
bringing the action shall be referred to as the qui tam plaintiff. 
Once filed, the action may be dismissed only with the written consent 
of the court, taking into account the best interests of the parties 
involved and the public purposes behind this act.
(2) A complaint filed by a private person under this subdivision 
shall be filed in superior court in camera and may remain under seal 
for up to 60 days. No service shall be made on the defendant until 
after the complaint is unsealed.
(3) On the same day as the complaint is filed pursuant to 
paragraph (2), the qui tam plaintiff shall serve by mail with "return 
receipt requested" the Attorney General with a copy of the complaint 
and a written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and 
information the person possesses.
(4) Within 60 days after receiving a complaint and written 
disclosure of material evidence and information alleging violations 
that involve state funds but not political subdivision funds, the 
Attorney General may elect to intervene and proceed with the action.
(5) The Attorney General may, for good cause shown, move the court 
for extensions of the time during which the complaint remains under
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seal pursuant to paragraph (2). The motion may be supported by 
affidavits or other submissions in camera.
(6) Before the expiration of the 60-day period or any extensions 
obtained under paragraph (5), the Attorney General shall do either of 
the following:
(A) Notify the court that it intends to proceed with the action, in 
which case the action shall be conducted by the Attorney General and 
the seal shall be lifted.
(B) Notify the court that it declines to proceed with the action, 
in which case the seal shall be lifted and the qui tam plaintiff 
shall have the right to conduct the action.
(7) (A) Within 15 days after receiving a complaint alleging 
violations that exclusively involve political subdivision funds, the 
Attorney General shall forward copies of the complaint and written 
disclosure of material evidence and information to the appropriate 
prosecuting authority for disposition, and shall notify the qui tam 
plaintiff of the transfer.
(B) Within 45 days after the Attorney General forwards the complaint 
and written disclosure pursuant to subparagraph (A) , the prosecuting 
authority may elect to intervene and proceed with the action.
(C) The prosecuting authority may, for good cause shown, move for 
extensions of the time during which the complaint remains under seal. 
The motion may be supported by affidavits or other submissions in 
camera.
(B) Before the expiration of the 45-day period or any extensions 
obtained under subparagraph (C), the prosecuting authority shall do 
either of the following:
(i) Notify the court that it intends to proceed with the action, 
in which case the action shall be conducted by the prosecuting 
authority and the seal shall be lifted.
(ii) Notify the court that it declines to proceed with the action, 
in which case the seal shall be lifted and the qui tam plaintiff 
shall have the right to conduct the action.
(8) (A) Within 15 days after receiving a complaint alleging 
violations that involve both state and political subdivision funds, 
the Attorney General shall forward copies of the complaint and 
written disclosure to the appropriate prosecuting authority, and 
shall coordinate its review and investigation with those of the 
prosecuting authority.
(B) Within 60 days after receiving a complaint and written disclosure 
of material evidence and information alleging violations that involve 
both state and political subdivision funds, the Attorney General or 
the prosecuting authority, or both, may elect to intervene and 
proceed with the action.
(C) The Attorney General or the prosecuting authority, or both, may, 
for good cause shown, move the court for extensions of the time 
during which the complaint remains under seal under paragraph (2).
The motion may be supported by affidavits or other submissions in 
camera.
(D) Before the expiration of the 60-day period or any extensions 
obtained under subparagraph (C), the Attorney General shall do one of 
the following:
(i) Notify the court that it intends to proceed with the action, in 
which case the action shall be conducted by the Attorney General and 
the seal shall be lifted.
(ii) Notify the court that it declines to proceed with the action but 
that the prosecuting authority of the political subdivision involved
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intends to proceed with the action, in which case the seal shall be 
lifted and the action shall be conducted by the prosecuting 
authority.
(iii) Notify the court that both it and the prosecuting authority 
decline to proceed with the action, in which case the seal shall be 
lifted and the qui tam plaintiff shall have the right to conduct the 
action.
(E) If the Attorney General proceeds with the action pursuant to 
clause (i) of subparagraph (D), the prosecuting authority of the 
political subdivision shall be permitted to intervene in the action 
within 60 days after the Attorney General notifies the court of its 
intentions. The court may authorize intervention thereafter upon a 
showing that all the requirements of Section 387 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure have been met.
(9) The defendant shall not be required to respond to any 
complaint filed under this section until 30 days after the complaint 
is unsealed and served upon the defendant pursuant to Section 583.210 
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(10) When a person brings an action under this subdivision, no other 
person may bring a related action based on the facts underlying the 
pending action.
(d) (1) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought
under subdivision (c) against a Member of the State Senate or 
Assembly, a member of the state judiciary, an elected official in the 
executive branch of the state, or a member of the governing body of 
any political subdivision if the action is based on evidence or 
information known to the state or political subdivision when the 
action was brought.
(2) A person may not bring an action under subdivision (c) that is 
based upon allegations or transactions that are the subject of a 
civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding in 
which the state or political subdivision is already a party.
(3) (A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this 
article based upon the public disclosure of allegations or 
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in an 
investigation, report, hearing, or audit conducted by or at the 
request of the Senate, Assembly, auditor, or governing body of a 
political subdivision, or by the news media, unless the action is 
brought by the Attorney General or the prosecuting authority of a 
political subdivision, or the person bringing the action is an 
original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), "original source" means an 
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the. 
information on which the allegations are based, who voluntarily 
provided the information to the state or political subdivision before 
filing an action based on that information, and whose information 
provided the basis or catalyst for the investigation, hearing, audit, 
or report that led to the public disclosure as described in 
subparagraph (A).
(4) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under 
subdivision (c) based upon information discovered by a present or 
former employee of the state or a political subdivision during the 
course of his or her employment unless that employee first, in good 
faith, exhausted existing internal procedures for reporting and 
seeking recovery of the falsely claimed sums through official 
channels and unless the state or political subdivision failed to act 
on the information provided within a reasonable period of time.
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(e) (1) If the state or political subdivision proceeds with the
action, it shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the 
action. The qui tam plaintiff shall have the right to continue as a 
full party to the action.
(2) (A) The state or political subdivision may seek to dismiss the
action for good cause notwithstanding the objections of the qui tam 
plaintiff if the qui tam plaintiff has been notified by the state or 
political subdivision of the filing of the motion and the court has 
provided the qui tam plaintiff with an opportunity to oppose the 
motion and present evidence at a hearing.
(B) The state or political subdivision may settle the action with the 
defendant notwithstanding the objections of the qui tam plaintiff if 
the court determines, after a hearing providing the qui tam plaintiff 
an opportunity to present evidence, that the proposed settlement is 
fair, adequate, and reasonable under all of the circumstances.
(f) (1) If the state or political subdivision elects not to
proceed, the qui tam plaintiff shall have the same right to conduct 
the action as the Attorney General or prosecuting authority would 
have had if it had chosen to proceed under subdivision (c). If the 
state or political subdivision so requests, and at its expense, the 
state or political subdivision shall be served with copies of all 
pleadings filed in the action and supplied with copies of all 
deposition transcripts.
(2) (A) Upon timely application, the court shall permit the state or
political subdivision to intervene in an action with which it had 
initially declined to proceed if the interest of the state or 
political subdivision in recovery of the property or funds involved 
is not being adequately represented by the qui tam plaintiff.
(B) If the state or political subdivision is allowed to intervene 
under paragraph (A), the qui tam plaintiff shall retain principal 
responsibility for the action and the recovery of the parties shall 
be determined as if the state or political subdivision had elected 
not to proceed.
(g) (1) (A) If the Attorney General initiates an action pursuant to
subdivision (a) or assumes control of an action initiated by a 
prosecuting authority pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (3) 
of subdivision (b), the office of the Attorney General shall receive 
a fixed 33 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the 
claim, which shall be used to support its ongoing investigation and 
prosecution of false claims.
(B) If a prosecuting authority initiates and conducts an action 
pursuant to subdivision (b), the office of the prosecuting authority 
shall receive a fixed 33 percent of the proceeds of the action or 
settlement of the claim, which shall be used to support its ongoing 
investigation and prosecution of false claims.
(C) If a prosecuting authority intervenes in an action initiated by 
the Attorney General pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) or 
remains a party to an action assumed by the Attorney General pursuant 
to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (3) of subdivision (b), the court 
may award the office of the prosecuting authority a portion of the 
Attorney General's fixed 33 percent of the recovery under
subparagraph (A), taking into account the prosecuting authority's 
role in investigating and conducting the action.
(2) If the state or political subdivision proceeds with an action 
brought by a qui tam plaintiff under subdivision (c), the qui tam 
plaintiff shall, subject to paragraphs (4) and (5), receive at least 
15 percent but not more than 33 percent of the proceeds of the action
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or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the 
qui tam plaintiff substantially contributed to the prosecution of the 
action. When it conducts the action, the Attorney General's office 
or the office of the prosecuting authority of the political
subdivision shall receive a fixed 33 percent of the proceeds of the 
action or settlement of the claim, which shall be used to support its 
ongoing investigation and prosecution of false claims made against 
the state or political subdivision. When both the Attorney General 
and a prosecuting authority are involved in a qui tam action pursuant 
to subparagraph (C) of paragraph (6) of subdivision (c), the court at 
its discretion may award the prosecuting authority a portion of the 
Attorney General's fixed 33 percent of the recovery, taking into 
account the prosecuting authority's contribution to investigating and 
conducting the action.
(3) If the state or political subdivision does not proceed with an 
action under subdivision (c), the qui tam plaintiff shall, subject to 
paragraphs (4) and (5), receive an amount that the court decides is 
reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and damages on behalf of 
the government. The amount shall be not less than 25 percent and not 
more than 50 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement and 
shall be paid out of these proceeds.
(4) If the action is one provided for under paragraph (4) of 
subdivision (d), the present or former employee of the state or 
political subdivision is not entitled to any minimum guaranteed 
recovery from the proceeds. The court, however, may award the qui 
tam plaintiff those sums from the proceeds as it considers 
appropriate, but in no case more than 33 percent of the proceeds if 
the state or political subdivision goes forth with the action or 50 
percent if the state or political subdivision declines to go forth, 
taking into account the significance of the information, the role of 
the qui tam plaintiff in advancing the case to litigation, and the 
scope of, and response to, the employee's attempts to report and gain 
recovery of the falsely claimed funds through official channels.
(5) If the action is one that the court finds to be based 
primarily on information from a present or former employee who 
actively participated in the fraudulent activity, the employee is not 
entitled to any minimum guaranteed recovery from the proceeds. The 
court, however, may award the qui tam plaintiff any sums from the 
proceeds that it considers appropriate, but in no case more than 33 
percent of the proceeds if the state or political subdivision goes 
forth with the action or 50 percent if the state or political 
subdivision declines to go forth, taking into account the 
significance of the information, the role of the qui tam plaintiff in 
advancing the case to litigation, the scope of the present or past 
employee's involvement in the fraudulent activity, the employee's 
attempts to avoid or resist the activity, and all other circumstances 
surrounding the activity.
(6) The portion of the recovery not distributed pursuant to 
paragraphs (1) to (5), inclusive, shall revert to the state if the 
underlying false claims involved state funds exclusively and to the 
political subdivision if the underlying false claims involved 
political subdivision funds exclusively. If the violation involved 
both state and political subdivision funds, the court shall make an 
apportionment between the state and political subdivision based on 
their relative share of the funds falsely claimed.
(7) For purposes of this section, "proceeds" include civil
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penalties as well as double or treble damages as provided in Section 
12651.
(8) If the state, political subdivision, or the qui tam plaintiff 
prevails in or settles any action under subdivision (c), the qui tam 
plaintiff shall receive an amount for reasonable expenses that the 
court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable costs 
and attorney's fees. All expenses, costs, and fees shall be awarded 
against the defendant and under no circumstances shall they be the 
responsibility of the state or political subdivision.
(9) If the state, a political subdivision, or the qui tam 
plaintiff proceeds with the action, the court may award to the 
defendant its reasonable attorney's fees and expenses against the 
party that proceeded with the action if the defendant prevails in the 
action and the court finds that the claim was clearly frivolous, 
clearly vexatious, or brought solely for purposes of harassment.
(h) The court may stay an act of discovery of the person 
initiating the action for a period of not more than 60 days if the 
Attorney General or local prosecuting authority show that the act of 
discovery would interfere with an investigation or a prosecution of a 
criminal or civil matter arising out of the same facts, regardless of 
whether the Attorney General or local prosecuting authority proceeds 
with the action. This showing shall be conducted in camera.
The court may extend the 60-day period upon a further showing in 
camera that the Attorney General or local prosecuting authority has 
pursued the criminal or civil investigation or proceedings with 
reasonable diligence and any proposed discovery in the civil action 
will interfere with the ongoing criminal or civil investigation or 
proceedings.
(i) Upon a showing by the Attorney General or local prosecuting 
authority that unrestricted participation during the course of the 
litigation by the person initiating the action would interfere with 
or unduly delay the Attorney General's or local prosecuting 
authority'
s prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or 
for purposes of harassment, the court may, in its discretion, impose 
limitations on the person's participation, including the following:
(1) Limiting the number of witnesses the person may call.
(2) Limiting the length of the testimony of the witnesses.
(3) Limiting the person's cross-examination of witnesses.
(4) Otherwise limiting the participation by the person in the 
litigation.
(j) The False Claims Act Fund is hereby created in the State 
Treasury. Proceeds from the action or settlement of the claim by the 
Attorney General pursuant to this article shall be deposited into 
this fund. Moneys in. this fund, upon appropriation by the
Legislature, shall be used by the Attorney General to support the 
ongoing investigation and prosecution of false claims in furtherance 
of this article.
12652.5. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the University 
of California shall be considered a political subdivision, and the 
General Counsel of the University of California shall be considered a 
prosecuting authority for the purposes of this article, and shall 
have the right to intervene in an action brought by the Attorney 
General or a private party or investigate and bring an action,
131
subject to Section 12652, if it is determined that the claim involves 
the University of California.
12653. (a) No employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule,
regulation, or policy preventing an employee from disclosing 
information to a government or law enforcement agency or from acting 
in furtherance of a false claims action, including investigating, 
initiating, testifying, or assisting in an action filed or to be 
filed under Section 12652.
(b) No employer shall discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, 
harass, deny promotion to, or in any other manner discriminate 
against, an employee in the terms and conditions of employment 
because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee 
or others in disclosing information to a government or law 
enforcement agency or in furthering a false claims action, including 
investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in, an 
action filed or to be filed under Section 12652.
(c) An employer who violates subdivision (b) shall be liable for all 
relief necessary to make the employee whole, including 
reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee would 
have had but for the discrimination, two times the amount of back 
pay, interest on the back pay, compensation for any special damage 
sustained as a result of the discrimination, and, where appropriate, 
punitive damages. In addition, the defendant shall be required to 
pay litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. An employee may 
bring an action in the appropriate superior court of the state for 
the relief provided in this subdivision.
(d) An employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, harassed, 
denied promotion, or in any other manner discriminated against in the 
terms and conditions of employment by his or her employer because of 
participation in conduct which directly or indirectly resulted in a 
false claim being submitted to the state or a political subdivision 
shall be entitled to the remedies under subdivision (c) if, and only 
if, both of the following occur:
(1) The employee voluntarily disclosed information to a government or 
law enforcement agency or acted in furtherance of a false claims 
action, including investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or 
assistance in an action filed or to be filed.
(2) The employee had been harassed, threatened with termination or 
demotion, or otherwise coerced by the employer or its management into 
engaging in the fraudulent activity in the first place.
12654. (a) A civil action under Section 12652 may not be filed more
than three years after the date of discovery by the official of the 
state or political subdivision charged with responsibility to act in 
the circumstances or, in any event, no more than 10 years after the 
date on which the violation of Section 12651 is committed.
(b) A civil action under Section 12652 may be brought for activity 
prior to January 1, 1988, if the limitations period set in 
subdivision (a) has not lapsed.
(c) In any action brought under Section 12652, the state,the 
political subdivision, or the qui tam plaintiff shall be required to
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prove all essential elements of the cause of action, including 
damages, by a preponderance of the evidence.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a guilty verdict
rendered in a criminal proceeding charging false statements or fraud, 
whether upon a verdict after trial or upon a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere, except for a plea of nolo contendere made prior to 
January 1, 1988, shall estop the defendant from denying the essential 
elements of the offense in any action which involves the same 
transaction as in the criminal proceeding and which is brought under 
subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 12652.
(e) Subdivision (b) of Section 47 of the Civil Code shall not be 
applicable to any claim subject to this article.
12655. (a) The provisions of this article are not exclusive, and the
remedies provided for in this article shall be in addition to any 
other remedies provided for in any other law or available under 
common law.
(b) If any provision of this article or the application thereof to 
any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the 
remainder of the article and the application of the provision to 
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
(c) This article shall be liberally construed and applied to 
promote the public interest.
133
REFERENCES
1. Albert, Tanya. "Doctors Win When Novel Use of False 
Claims Act Rejected" AM News 11 Mar. 2002:
Chttp://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2002/03/ll/gvsd0311. htm>
pgs. 1-2.
2. Ashcraft "Whistle Blower Litigation Under The Federal 
False Claims Act - Qui Tam Claims
chttp://www.ashcraftandgerel.com/whistleb.html> pgs. 1-3.
3. Bartley, Daniel R. "Attorney General Grants Listeners 
Standing to Sue Pacifica" 9 Sept. 2000:
chttp://www.theexperiment.org/articles.php?news id=796>
pgs. 1-2.
4. Benson, Phillip. "History of the Law"
chttp://www.philbenson.com/historyl,htm> pgs. 1-9.
5. Bernhard, Aaron. "Examples of Qui Tam Lawsuits"
chttp://www.antifraudlawgroup.com/false claims act example
s.htm> pgs. 1-14.
6. Brothers, Stephan. "Protecting the Government's
Interest"
chttp://installfest.teknoids.net/ELJ/volumes/sum98/frieden
.html> pgs. 1-5.
7. California Transportation Commission (CTC) The 1994 
State Transportation Imporvement Program: Seven Year
Period - 1994/95 Thru 2000/01. Sacramento, CA: State of 
California, 1994. pgs. 1-50.
8. Darby, S. "What's New, What's New" C http://www.public- 
works-fraud, com/news .html> pg. 1.
9. Department of Justice (DOJ). "Justice Department 
Recovers More than $2 Billion in False Claims Act Awards 
and Settlements"
Chttp://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1998/Qctober/503 civ.htm> pg.
2.
10. Deukmejian, George. Governor's Budget 1990-91
Sacramento, CA: State of California, 1990. Pgs. BTH 79- 
108.
134
11. Diepenbrook, Eileen M. and. Gene K. Cheever.
Construction Claims in California. Eau Clair, Wisconsin: 
Lorman Education Services, 2003. pgs. 101-113.
12. Gerson, Stuart "Fifth Circuit Affirms Riley Qui Tam 
Decisions"
<http://www.ahla.org/docs/riley gersonsummary,pdf> pgs. 1-
3.
13. Gold, Matea. "MTA Suit Goes to Jury for Damages" Los 
Angeles Times 3 Oct. 2001: B12+
14. Gould, Russell. "Capital Outlay and Infrastructure 
Report 1995" California Department of Finance Capital 
Outlay Unit., pgs. 1-28.
15. Governmental Accountability Project (GAP)
<http://www.whistleblower.org/> pgs. 1-5.
16. Harris, Guy. "Caltrans Legal Status of Arbitration 
Cases Through August 2002" California Department of 
Transportation Powerpoint: Presented: 17 Oct. 2003 pgs. 1- 
22.
17. http://www.constructionweblinks.com/Resources/ 
IndustryReports Newsletters/May 7 2001/contractor caltrans
.html
18. http://www.falseclaims.com/HTML/FRM/hist f.html
19. http://www.falseclaims.com/HTML/FRM/85 f.html
20. http://www.legalethics.com/index.law
21. http://www.taf.org/federalfca.html> pgs. 1-20.
22. http://www.taf.org/theact.html
23. Katz, Brain D.
http://www.hermanmathis.com/attorneys/katz brian d full.ht 
ml>
24. Lichtman, D. "What is the History of the False Claims 
Act"
http://www.whistleblowerlaws.com/temp/questions/cat4qu4 . ht
ml pgs. 1-4.
135
25. Markman, Jon D. "Engineer alleges company gave ’low- 
ball' bids and fraudulently submitted change orders that 
boosted costs by $10 million. Agency seeks to join legal 
action." Los Angeles Times 13 Nov. 1996; B2+
26. McCarthy, A. "History of the Federal False Claims Act" 
<http://www.warrenbensonlaw.com/html/page570551. htm> pgs. 
1-9.
27. Mintzberg, Henry. Mintzberger on Management: Inside 
Our Strange World of Organizations. New York, NY: 
McMillian, 1989. pgs 1-16.
28. Molina, Josa L. "The Informal Organizational Chart in 
Organizations: An Approach from the Social Network 
Analysis" < http://www.sfu.ca/~insna/Connections- 
Web/Voluitie24-l/8-Molina-24.1 .pdf >. pgs. 1-14.
29. Perez, J. "False Claims Act"
http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/1999/9901idx.htm pgs.
1-7.
30. Phillips, John R. <http://www.phillipsandcohen.com>. 
pgs. 1-3.
31. Rabin. Jeffrey L. "Judge Rules Against MTA Contractor" 
Los Angeles Times 11 July 2001: 1+
32. Rosta, Paul. "Judges Ruling Hits Tutor-Saliba" Friends 
of the Metro Redline 16 July 2001: 1
<http://www.friends4theredline.com/pp/articles/20010716tut
or,php3>
33. Strayhorn, Eric.
<http://www.strayhornlaw.com/attorneys.htm>
34. Streeter, Kurt. "MTA Contractor Loses Appeal on Damage 
Award" Los Angeles Times 17 Oct. 2001: B3+
35. Taxpayers Against Fraud. "Anti-Kickback and Self 
Referral Violations/Constitu-tionality." False Claims Act 
and Qui Tam Quarterly Review Volume 14 (October 1998).
36. Taxpayers Against Fraud. "Constitutionality." False 
Claims Act and Qui Tam Quarterly Review Volume 16 (April 
1999) pgs. 1-40.
136
37. Taxpayers Against Fraud. "Constitutionality of False 
Claims Act." False Claims Act and Qui Tam Quarterly Review 
Volume 12 (January 1998).
38. Taxpayers Against Fraud. "False Claims Involving 
Compliance with Environmental Law/Constitutionality."
False Claims Act and Qui Tam Quarterly Review (July 
1995).
39. Taxpayers Against Fraud. "Litigation Developments." 
False Claims Act and Qui Tam Quarterly Review Volume 17 
(July 1999).
40. Taxpayers Against Fraud. "Public Disclosure Bar and 
Original Source Exception." False Claims Act and Qui Tam 
Quarterly Review Volume 20 (October 2000).
41. Taxpayers Against Fraud. "Supreme Court
Ruling/Constitutional Standing/State Qui Tam Liability." 
False Claims Act and Qui Tam Quarterly Review Volume 19 
(July 2000).
42. The California FCA Law Source-:
http: //www. leginfo. ca.gov/cgibin/w...394227395+l+0+0&WAISact 
ion=retrieve> pgs. 1-12.
43. The Federal FCA Law Source:
<http://www4.law.Cornell.edu/uscode/>
44. Ueda, Kara
http://www.sacbar.org/members/saclawyer/june2Q02/courtstep
s. html
45. United States Supreme Court ex rel. Marcus v. Hess 
<http://caselaw.Ip.findlaw.com/cgi-
bin/getease.pl?court=USSvo1=317&invol=537> pgs. 1-3.
46. Wikipedia-: The Free Encyclopedia, "The History of 
Common Law" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common law pgs. 
1-5.
47. Wilson, Pete. Govenor's Budget 1994-95 Sacramento, CA-: 
State of California, 1994. pgs. BTH 49-72.
137
48. Zerhman, A. "Representative Engagements"
<http://www.hewm.com/attorneys/attorneyBio.asp?attorneyID 
619>
138
